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RESOLVING THE DIVIDED PATENT INFRINGEMENT
DILEMMA
Nathaniel Grow*
ABSTRACT
This Article considers cases of divided patent infringement: those in which two
or more parties collectively perform all the steps of a patented claim, but where no
single party acting alone has completed the entire patented invention. Despite the
increasing frequency with which such cases appear to be arising, courts have strug-
gled to equitably resolve these lawsuits under the constraints of the existing
statutory framework because of the competing policy concerns they present. On the
one hand, any standard that holds two or more parties strictly liable whenever their
combined actions infringe a patent risks imposing liability on countless seemingly
innocent actors who are unaware that their activities are being combined with those
of another party to infringe a patent. On the other hand, any attempts to establish
more restrictive conditions for the imposition of divided infringement liability have
inevitably created loopholes through which parties can easily structure their activi-
ties to avoid incurring infringement liability.
While scholars have previously recognized the difficulties presented by divided
infringement lawsuits, this Article offers a novel explanation for why these cases
have proven to be particularly challenging for courts to resolve. Specifically, al-
though courts were historically well equipped to handle cases of divided
infringement at common law through the imposition of contributory tort liability,
Congress’s shortsighted codification of the law of patent infringement in the Patent
Act of 1952—and its narrow formulation of the doctrine of contributory patent
infringement in particular—currently prevents the judiciary from relying on this
common law doctrine to its full historic extent.
This Article asserts that Congress should correct this mistake by enacting a new
statutory provision to govern cases of divided patent infringement. By allowing
courts to impose liability on any party who knowingly collaborates with another to
infringe a patent, Congress can prevent would-be infringers from intentionally cir-
cumventing patent protection, while at the same time ensuring that innocent actors
who may unwittingly contribute to an infringement are not unfairly exposed to
liability.
* Associate Professor of Legal Studies, Terry College of Business, University of
Georgia. This research was supported by a Terry-Sanford research grant from the Terry
College of Business. The author would like to thank Devin Desai and two anonymous
reviewers from the Academy of Legal Studies in Business for supplying helpful comments on
an earlier version of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
A potential case of divided patent infringement arises whenever
two or more parties collectively perform all of the steps of a pat-
ented claim, but no single party acting alone has itself completed
the entire patented invention.1 Take, for example, a patent claim-
ing a process for transferring multimedia files more quickly and
1. See, e.g., Alice Juwon Ahn, Note, Finding Vicarious Liability in U.S. Patent Law: The
“Control or Direction” Standard for Joint Infringement, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 149, 149 (2009)
(noting that cases “where infringement can only be found by combining the conduct of more
than one actor” are “commonly called ‘joint’ or ‘divided’ infringement”).
Courts and commentators have applied differing terminology when referring to divided
infringement cases, with some instead referring to infringement through the combined ac-
tions of multiple parties as “joint” or “multiactor” infringement. See Lynda J. Oswald,
Simplifying Multiactor Patent Infringement Cases Through Proper Application of Common Law Doc-
trine, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 3 (2014) (stating that “[w]hile the term ‘multiactor’ is not completely
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efficiently over the Internet.2 If one of the patent owner’s competi-
tors were to duplicate this entire process itself, then the patent-
holder could sue the violator directly for infringement. But if the
performance of the infringing acts were instead split between the
competing company and one of its customers—with neither party
itself performing the entire patented method—then the patentee’s
only recourse would be to sue under a theory of divided
infringement.
These sorts of divided infringement claims arise most often in
cases involving so-called “method” or “process” patent claims—
those protecting a series of steps used to perform a particular func-
tion or achieve a specific result (such as the automobile assembly
line process). Unlike apparatus or system claims—which are in-
fringed by anyone who sells or uses an infringing machine, or
controls an infringing network, respectively, regardless of how
many parties contributed to its construction—method patents can
only be infringed by someone who performs each and every step of
a patented claim.3
Historically, the unauthorized performance of a patented
method by multiple actors occurred relatively rarely, as any physical
separation between the would-be infringers typically made it im-
practical to divide the performance of a process between parties.
The digital age has made this form of infringement much easier to
coordinate, however.  Parties can now often work together easily via
networked computers to divide the infringement of a patented
new to the patent infringement lexicon, courts more typically use the terms ‘joint infringe-
ment’ or ‘divided infringement.’”). This Article will employ the more widely accepted
“divided infringement” phrasing to describe this form of activity.
2. This example is drawn from U.S. Patent No. 6,108,703, the underlying patent at
issue in the Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. case discussed at length in Parts
III.B and III.C, infra.
3. See Centillion Data Sys. v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 631 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (holding that system claims are infringed by whoever “control[s] the system as a whole
and obtain[s] benefit from it.”); Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA
Q.J. 255, 275 (2005) (explaining that “[d]irect and/or indirect infringement remedies
may . . . be more readily available” in cases of apparatus patents because “some act of making,
using, selling, or importing will eventually correspond to the claimed apparatus, even if
based originally on contributions from multiple parties.”); see also Kerry J. Begley, Multina-
tional Patent Enforcement: What the “Parochial” United States Can Learn from Past and Present
European Initiatives, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 521, 534 n.122 (2007) (describing an apparatus
claim as “a patent claim on a mechanical device or structure”); Melissa Feeney Wasserman,
Note: Divided Infringement: Expanding the Extraterritorial Scope of Patent Law,  82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
281, 285 (2007) (observing that “[a] system claim may comprise multiple distinct
components.”).
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method, regardless of their physical proximity.4 Consequently, di-
vided infringement cases have arisen with growing frequency in
recent years,5 impacting a variety of increasingly important sectors
of the economy, including wireless communications, personalized
medicine, biotechnology, and financial services.6 This trend is likely
to accelerate in the future, as the so-called “Internet of Things” con-
nects countless new devices—including everything from
wristwatches to washing machines—to the Internet, increasing the
frequency with which multiple parties interact through new tech-
nology,7 and thus heightening the risk that separate actors may
divide the performance of a patented method amongst themselves.8
Unfortunately, courts have struggled to equitably resolve divided
infringement lawsuits under the existing statutory framework.9 Be-
cause the Patent Act of 1952 (the Patent Act) imposes strict liability
on anyone who directly infringes a patent—i.e., anyone who per-
forms all of the steps of a patented claim, regardless of their
knowledge of the patent10—courts have generally been hesitant to
broadly apply this principle to the combined actions of two or more
4. See Patrick E. King, et al., Navigating the Shoals of Joint Infringement, Indirect Infringe-
ment, and Territoriality Doctrines: A Comparative Analysis of Chinese and American Patent Laws, 25
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 275, 278–79 (2012) (noting that “[i]ncreasingly, software and hardware-
based systems and methods practiced in ‘the cloud’ implicate the conduct of several actors
performing claim steps in different jurisdictions.”).
5. See Oswald, supra note 1, at 4 (stating that “[a]lthough it is difficult to quantify, the
incidence of multiactor patent infringement appears to be growing.”).
6. See W. Keith Robinson, Economic Theory, Divided Infringement and Enforcing Interactive
Patents, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1961, 1967–68 (2015), [hereinafter Robinson, Economic Theory] (find-
ing that “divided infringement raises particular problems” not only for “Internet Age”
inventions like “wireless technology, Internet retail, and financial services,” but also “person-
alized medicine, biotechnology and other technology areas where process patents are sought
to protect innovation”).
7. See Adam D. Thierer, The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy
and Security Concerns Without Derailing Innovation, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 6, 6 (2015) (explain-
ing that the Internet of Things “comprises networked ‘smart devices’ equipped with
microchips, sensors, and wireless communications capabilities”); see also Ryan Calo, Digital
Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1005 (2014) (recognizing the trend that
“thermometers, appliances, glasses, watches, and other artifacts” will increasingly “become
networked into an ‘Internet of Things.’”); Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things:
First Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85,
87–88 (2014) (identifying a variety of devices comprising the Internet of Things).
8. See infra notes 194–196 and accompanying text.
9. See infra Part III (recounting the various standards courts have formulated in divided
infringement cases); see also W. Keith Robinson, No “Direction” Home: An Alternative Approach to
Joint Infringement, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 65 (2012) [hereinafter Robinson, No “Direction”] (re-
porting that “[i]n the wake of this technological paradigm shift, it is the unenviable job of the
Federal Circuit to apply laws crafted in consideration of 1950s technology to the cutting edge
innovations of today.”).
10. See, e.g., Nathaniel Grow, Joint Patent Infringement Following Akamai, 51 AM. BUS. L.J.
71, 80 (2014) (explaining that “Direct infringement under [35 U.S.C. §] 271(a) is thus a
strict liability offense; a defendant can be liable for infringement even if she is unaware of the
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parties working together.11 Indeed, imposing strict liability in di-
vided infringement cases would risk holding parties liable even
though they may have had no idea that their otherwise innocent
activities were being combined with those of another party to vio-
late a patent.12 At the same time, however, any judicial attempts to
formulate narrower standards for divided infringement have inevi-
tably created potential loopholes through which would-be
infringers can circumvent patent infringement liability with relative
ease by intentionally dividing the performance of a patented
method among two or more parties working together at arms-
length.13
These preceding competing policy concerns presented by di-
vided infringement have created a significant dilemma for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—the nation’s primary ap-
pellate patent court—that has proven to be particularly difficult to
resolve. As a result, the Federal Circuit has formulated six different
standards in divided patent infringement cases in just the last dec-
ade alone.14 Unfortunately, such judicial inconsistency has cast
doubt on the practical enforceability of countless patents, threaten-
ing to disincentivize socially beneficial research and development
activities across wide swaths of the new economy.15
While scholars have previously acknowledged the dilemma posed
by divided infringement,16 the existing literature on the topic fails
to correctly identify the root cause of the problem. Specifically,
patent’s existence.”); Lynda J. Oswald, The Intent Element of “Inducement to Infringe” Under Pat-
ent Law: Reflections on Grokster, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 225, 229 (2006) (“Thus,
liability for direct infringement of a patent is, in effect, a strict liability provision.”).
11. See Akamai Tech., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1307 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014) (“Because direct infringement
is a strict liability tort, it has been thought that extending liability in that manner would
ensnare actors who did not themselves commit all the acts necessary to constitute infringe-
ment and who had no way of knowing that others were acting in a way that rendered their
collective conduct infringing.”).
12. See Robinson, No “Direction,” supra note 9, at 66 (recognizing concern that a broad
application of Section 271(a)’s strict liability regime to divided infringement cases could en-
snare “innocent actors”).
13. See Oswald, supra note 1, at 12 (finding that “courts have recognized . . . that al-
lowing parties to evade infringement liability merely by divvying up their actions among
multiple actors can be grossly unfair to patent rights holders”).
14. See infra Part III (reviewing the Federal Circuit’s various divided infringement
precedents).
15. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (noting the diverse array of industries af-
fected by divided patent infringement).
16. See, e.g., Ahn, supra note 1, at 170 (declaring that the limitations placed on divided
infringement cases allows parties to “escape liability”); Joshua P. Larsen, Liability for Divided
Performance of Process Claims After BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 19 DEPAUL J. ART,
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 41, 72 (2008) (describing the then-existing law as creating a “loop-
hole” in divided infringement cases); Ben Morgan, Joint Infringement and the Impact of BMC
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much of the difficulty presented by divided infringement has re-
sulted from the shortsighted manner in which Congress drafted the
Patent Act—its most recent comprehensive overhaul of U.S. patent
policy—in 1952. The Patent Act created a new statutory provision,
Section 271, to govern the infringement of a patent.17 Unfortu-
nately, although courts had historically been well-equipped to
resolve cases of divided infringement through the application of
the traditional common law tort principle of contributory liability—
imposing liability whenever two or more parties knowingly worked
together to injure a plaintiff18—the Patent Act prevents courts from
relying on this doctrine in present-day divided infringement cases.
Indeed, because the Patent Act specifically limits the imposition of
contributory infringement liability to a narrow set of lawsuits involv-
ing only the most pressing form of contributory infringement
occurring at the time the Act was adopted, contributory liability
cannot arise today in cases where no single actor alone infringes the
patent.19
This Article asserts that Congress should modify the Patent Act to
remedy the unintended consequences of the shortsighted codifica-
tion of the law of contributory patent infringement.20 In particular,
it proposes adding a new subsection to the Patent Act that autho-
rizes courts to apply the principles underlying the traditional
common law tort doctrine of contributory liability in cases of di-
vided patent infringement.21 By creating a new statutory provision
imposing liability whenever two or more parties knowingly and col-
lectively infringe a patent, Congress can prevent parties from
working together to circumvent patent protection without trigger-
ing the policy concerns that would arise under the existing statutory
Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 12 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 173, 176 (2009) (identify-
ing ways in which parties could circumvent divided infringement liability); Dolly Wu, Joint
Infringement and Internet Software Patents: An Uncertain Future?, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 439, 441 (2009) (contending that the vicarious liability requirement for divided in-
fringement is “unlikely” to be met in many Internet-related cases).
17. Previously, patent infringement had been governed by common law principles. See
Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521,
521–22 (1953) (noting that before 1952, it was left “to the judicial branch to settle the ques-
tion of infringement when requested to do so by patent owners. Under these circumstances
the courts evolved their own . . . law on infringement, with no legislative guidance.”).
18. See infra notes 36–37 and 50–54 and accompanying text (describing the applicability
of contributory liability under tort law).
19. See infra notes 107–110 and accompanying text (discussing the manner in which the
Patent Act prevents courts from incorporating tort contributory liability doctrine in patent
cases).
20. For an explanation of the limitations placed on contributory infringement by the
Patent Act, see infra notes 67–71 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 205–206 and accompanying text (discussing proposed statutory
provision).
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framework should those who unwittingly perform only a small por-
tion of a patent be held strictly liable for its infringement.22
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I reviews the pre-1952
case law and traces the common law development of the law of pat-
ent infringement, and the doctrine of contributory infringement in
particular. Part II then considers the codification of this doctrine in
the Patent Act, making the novel observation that congressional
shortsightedness in 1952 prevents courts today from employing the
common law principle best suited for resolving most divided in-
fringement lawsuits. Part III examines the resulting difficulties that
courts have faced when trying to fairly resolve cases of divided in-
fringement under the existing statutory framework. Finally, Part IV
asserts that Congress should act to correct its shortsighted codifica-
tion of the law of contributory infringement, and proposes a new
statutory provision that would fully reincorporate the common law
tort doctrine of contributory liability into the Patent Act. This new
provision would allow courts to equitably balance the competing
policy issues implicated by divided patent infringement lawsuits.
I. THE COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY PATENT
INFRINGEMENT DOCTRINE
To fully appreciate the shortcomings of the Patent Act, a brief
review of the pre-1952 development of the common law of contrib-
utory patent infringement is necessary. Before the passage of the
Patent Act, no statutory provision governed patent infringement.23
Instead, courts drew upon traditional common law tort principles
to resolve patent infringement lawsuits, analogizing the infringe-
ment of a patent to a trespass on another’s property.24
22. See infra notes 99–102 and accompanying text (identifying policy concerns raised by
resolving divided infringement cases under the current statute).
23. See, e.g., Michael Liu Su, A Rock and a Hard Place: Choosing Between § 271(A) and (B) for
Divided Infringement in Akamai, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 609, 610 (2013) (reporting that “pat-
ent infringement law was codified for the first time in 1952”); see also Melissa Y. Lerner, You
Can Run, But You Can’t Hide: The Expansion of Direct Infringement and the Evisceration of Preven-
tive Contracting in Maersk, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 207, 209 (2011) (“First enacted
in 1952, § 271(a) of the 1952 Patent Act codified the common law approach to patent
infringement.”).
24. See, e.g., Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 721–22 (6th Cir.
1897) (“An infringement of a patent is a tort analogous to trespass or trespass on the
case . . . .”); see also James G. Dilmore, Actual Knowledge of Direct Infringement is Required for
Induced Infringement: Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 50 DUQ. L. REV. 659, 668
(2012) (noting that “[b]efore passage of the Patent Act, patent infringement existed as a
judicially created tort”); Mark Tomlinson, Whodunnit? Divided Patent Infringement in Light of
Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 7 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 129,
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In order to find a party liable for infringement, however, courts
at common law generally required a showing that the defendant
performed each step of at least one claim from the asserted patent.
Indeed, U.S. courts have traditionally viewed every element of a pat-
ent claim to be an essential part of the invention.25 As the U.S.
Supreme Court explained in Union Water-Meter Co. v. Desper, “Our
law requires the patentee to specify particularly what he claims to
be new, and if he claims a combination of certain elements or parts,
we cannot declare that any one of these elements is immaterial.
The patentee makes them all material by the restricted form of his
claim.”26 As a result, the unauthorized performance of some, but
not all, of the steps of a patent claim could not support a finding of
infringement at common law, a doctrine that has come to be
known as the “all-elements” or “all-limitations” rule.27
Before long, would-be infringers realized that this requirement
provided a possible avenue for circumventing infringement liabil-
ity. By performing all but one step of a patented invention—leaving
it to their customers to contribute the final element and complete
the would-be infringement—companies could theoretically evade
infringement liability under the all-elements rule. Initially, this fact
pattern arose most often in lawsuits involving apparatus patents. In
the seminal 1871 case of Wallace v. Holmes,28 for example, a manu-
facturer produced all but one part of a patented oil lamp, including
all of the lamp’s key inventive components, but let its customers
supply the final piece of the patented apparatus—the lamp’s chim-
ney.29 Because the manufacturer of the infringing lamp did not
perform all of the patented steps itself, the patent-holder could not
sue it directly for infringement under the traditional doctrine; in-
stead, the patentee’s only recourse would have been to sue each of
131 (2013) (“Patent infringement in the United States was originally a matter of common
law.”).
25. See Prouty v. Ruggles, 41 U.S. 336 (1842) (holding that a defendant must use all
three parts of an invention, not just two, for an infringement to have occurred).
26. 101 U.S. 332, 337 (1879).
27. See Joshua P. Larsen, Liability for Divided Performance of Process Claims After BMC Re-
sources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 19 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 41, 49 (2008)
(explaining that under “the ‘All Limitations’ or the ‘All Elements’ rule . . . ‘each element of a
claim is [considered] material and essential.’”); Joshua R. Nightingale, An Empirical Study on
the Use of Technical Advisors in Patent Cases, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 400, 408 (2011)
(stating that the requirement that plaintiff “show that the alleged infringing device contains
each claim limitation or its equivalent . . . is known as the ‘all elements’ or ‘all limitations’
rule”).
28. 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100).
29. Id. at 79.
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the manufacturer’s customers individually, an overly burdensome
and unrealistic task.30
Recognizing the seeming injustice presented by cases like this,
courts at common law turned to various tort doctrines governing
vicarious and contributory liability to hold would-be infringers lia-
ble for performing some, but not all, of the infringing acts.
Through the doctrine of vicarious liability, for instance, courts
could hold parties liable for another’s infringing activities in situa-
tions where the first party possessed the ability to direct or control
the second party’s action.31 Courts typically premised liability in
these cases on the law of agency, under which one party (the princi-
pal) agreed to have the other (its agent) act on its behalf and
subject to its control.32 In these situations, the principal could then
fairly be held liable for the infringing acts committed by its agent.
For example, in Crowell v. Baker Oil Tools33 the would-be infringer
did not manufacture any of the infringing oil well casings itself, but
instead contracted with another company to produce the accused
devices on its behalf.34 In resolving the case, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals observed, “It is obvious that one may infringe a
patent if he employ an agent for that purpose . . . .”35 Thus, in cases
where the infringing parties had formed an agency relationship,
the principal could be held vicariously liable for the acts of the
agent, giving rise to a finding of direct infringement at common
law.
30. See id. (noting that if the manufacturer were not held liable for infringement, “the
complainants would be driven to the task of searching out the individual purchasers for use
who actually place the chimney on the burner and use it—a consequence which, considering
the small value of each separate lamp, and the trouble and expense of prosecution, would
make the complainants helpless and remediless.”).
31. See Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, The Secret Life of Legal Doctrine: The Diver-
gent Evolution of Secondary Liability in Trademark and Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1363, 1367 (2006) (finding that “[t]he most common test used to determine vicarious liabil-
ity is control or the right to control the direct tortfeasor.”); Oswald, supra note 1, at 16–17
(explaining that “vicarious liability . . . implicates some measure of direction or control over
the actors actually engaging in the infringing acts.”).
32. See Ken Hobday, Comment: The Incredibly Ever-Shrinking Theory of Joint Infringement:
Multi-Actor Method Claims, 38 CAP. U.L. REV. 137, 158 (2009) (observing that “vicarious liabil-
ity ordinarily requires some kind of consensual arrangement in which an agent agrees to act
under a principal’s control”); Note, An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious Liability Under the Law of
Agency, 91 YALE L.J. 168, 168 (1981) (stating that “[a]n important basis for the imposition of
vicarious liability on a business principal is the existence of ‘control’ or a right of ‘control’ by
the principal over the physical conduct of his agent.”).
33. 143 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1944).
34. See id. at 1004 (noting that the plaintiff in the declaratory judgement suit was “not
engaged in manufacturing the device”).
35. Id.
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Meanwhile, in cases where the infringing acts were divided be-
tween two parties not connected through an agency relationship,
courts at common law could still potentially hold the defendants
liable under the traditional tort doctrine of contributory liability.36
As summarized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, contributory tort
liability applies to “[e]ach of two or more persons whose tortious
conduct is a legal cause of a single and indivisible harm to the in-
jured party.”37 Expounding on this theory in the patent
infringement context, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that, at
common law, contributory infringement liability served to “protect
patent rights from subversion by those who, without directly infring-
ing the patent themselves, engage in acts designed to facilitate
infringement by others. This protection is of particular importance
in situations . . . where enforcement against [the] direct infringers
would be difficult.”38 For example, in the 1872 case of Renwick v.
Pond,39 the court held that a defendant was contributorily liable for
selling an infringing firearm even though its customers had sup-
plied the actual cartridge fired from the gun, which was an explicit
part of the patented invention.40
Although courts at common law did not always clearly identify
which theory of indirect liability they were imposing in a particular
case, this general framework allowed them to capture most wrong-
ful acts of infringement. In the abovementioned case of Wallace v.
Holmes,41 for instance, the court ruled that the company manufac-
turing most, but not all, of a patented oil lamp “virtually” infringed
the patent when it knew its customers would add the final infring-
ing piece themselves.42 Thus, the Wallace court, in effect, applied
the basic tort theory of contributory liability and held the manufac-
turer liable for assisting in the ultimate infringement of the patent.
Indeed, imposition of contributory liability in cases like Wallace v.
Holmes is consistent with the doctrine delineated by the Restatement
36. See Oswald, supra note 1, at 18 (explaining that “contributory tortfeasors can be held
jointly and severally liable for the wrongdoing.”).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1979).
38. Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 188 (1980); see also
Robinson, No “Direction”, supra note 9, at 69 (“Under this early formulation of contributory
infringement, ‘one who intentionally caused, or aided and abetted, the commission of a tort
by another was jointly and severally liable with the primary tortfeasor.’”) (quoting Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
39. 20 F. Cas. 536 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1872) (No. 11,702).
40. See id.
41. 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100); see also supra notes 28–30 and ac-
companying text (discussing case).
42. Wallace, 29 F. Cas. at 75.
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(Second) of Torts, which specifies that a defendant can be held con-
tributorily liable when she knowingly either (i) commits “a tortious
act in concert with [an]other or pursuant to a common design with
him,” or (ii) gives someone “substantial assistance or encourage-
ment” to commit a tortious act themselves.43
Most contributory infringement cases in the late 1800s and early
1900s proceeded along similar lines.44 Because these cases typically
involved a patented apparatus—as opposed to a patented
method—some party inevitably sold or used the entire infringing
device, and as a result, could be held directly liable for infringe-
ment,45 with any contributing parties subject to indirect liability for
vicarious or contributory infringement. As a result, courts were
rarely, if ever, required to delineate the outer limits of contributory
infringement liability.46
Most significantly for present purposes, it does not appear that
courts at common law were ever called on to determine whether
contributory infringement liability would arise in cases where two
or more parties each performed some, but not all, of the infringing
steps of a patented method or process. In these cases, although the
parties performed the entire patented process, no single actor com-
pleted the entire infringement herself, as was traditionally required
at common law.47 While there do not appear to be any reported
decisions from the era considering this issue, an 1890 patent trea-
tise did suggest that “[a]ll who perform or who unite in the
performance of an act of infringement . . . may be sued jointly or
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979).
44. See, e.g., Travers v. Beyer, 26 F. 450 (C.C.N.D. N.Y. 1886); Boyd v. Cherry, 50 F. 279
(C.C.D. Iowa 1883); American Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882); Strobridge v.
Lindsay, Sterritt & Co., 6 F. 510 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1881); Rumford Chemical Works v. Hecker, 20
F. Cas. 1342, No. 12133 (C.C.D. N.J. 1876); American Cotton Tie Supply Co. v. Bullard, 1 F.
Cas. 625, No. 294 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1879); Bowker v. Dows, 3 F. Cas. 1070, No. 1734 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1878); Richardson v. Noyes, 20 F. Cas. 723, No. 11792 (C.C.D. Mass. 1876); see also R.
CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 15:4 (4th ed. 2003) (identifying early contributory
infringement cases).
45. See, e.g., Lemley et al., supra note 3, at 275 (explaining that “[d]irect and/or indirect
infringement remedies may . . . be more readily available” in cases of apparatus patents be-
cause “some act of making, using, selling, or importing will eventually correspond to the
claimed apparatus, even if based originally on contributions from multiple parties.”).
46. See Charles W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for Patent Infringement, 22
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 375 (2006) (declaring that “[t]here was some
uncertainty in the early cases as to what was required for a defendant to be liable for contrib-
utory infringement.”).
47. See Edwin M. Thomas, The Law of Contributory Infringement, 21 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 811,
835 (1939) (noting that at common law, “[t]here must [have] be[en] a complete infringe-
ment somewhere before a contributor is liable”).
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severally” for violating the patent.48 The treatise failed to cite any
supporting case law for this proposition, however.49 As a result, it is
unknown whether, or how, a common law court would have im-
posed contributory liability in such cases.
Although no case directly posed this question at common law,
the doctrine of contributory tort liability would have been particu-
larly well-suited to handle these sorts of cases of divided
infringement. As with the common law tort doctrine, divided in-
fringement inflicts an injury on the patentee through the combined
actions of two or more parties.50 And perhaps more significantly,
divided infringement, like contributory tort liability, presents a situ-
ation in which “the acts of each of two or more [infringing] parties,
standing alone, would not be wrongful, but together they cause
harm to the plaintiff.”51 Therefore, this doctrine was particularly
well-suited to address cases in which each individual divided in-
fringer’s actions alone did not constitute wrongful conduct, since
they encompassed only a portion of the patented process (and
therefore did not individually satisfy the all-elements rule).52 Impor-
tantly, however, unlike the strict liability regime currently imposed
in direct infringement cases under the Patent Act,53 contributory
tort liability at common law required that a defendant be reasona-
bly aware that his or her actions were being combined with those of
another to injure the plaintiff.54 Such a requirement would have
served to obviate any concern in the patent infringement context
about holding an otherwise innocent actor legally accountable for
unwittingly performing one part of an infringing method.
48. WILLIAM ROBINSON, 3 THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 135 (1890); see
also Albert H. Walker, Textbook of the Patent Laws of the United States of America § 406
(4th ed. 1904) (“Where several persons cooperate in any infringement, all those persons are
liable therefor as contributors thereto. In that, as in all cases of torts for which several per-
sons are liable, all may be sued jointly, or any of them may be sued alone.”).
49. See generally ROBINSON, supra note 48, at § 135. The treatise did cite precedent stand-
ing for a different proposition, however, namely that both one who unlawfully manufactures
a patented invention and another party who then sells the infringing device can be held
liable for infringement. See id. (citing Jennings v. Dolan, 29 Fed. Rep. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1887)).
50. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text (describing the most common types of
divided infringement cases).
51. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 52, at 354 (5th
ed. 1984).
52. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text (reciting the historical underpinnings
of the all-elements rule).
53. See infra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing the imposition of strict liability
under Section 271(a)).
54. See Oswald, supra note 1, at 18 (stating that contributory tort liability “is tempered by
a ‘culpability requirement’ that considers ‘whether a reasonable person, standing in the
shoes of the defendant, would have been aware of the misdeeds of another’”) (quoting Bar-
tholomew, infra note 95, at 465).
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As Part II reveals, however, the potential promise of this doctrine
was undone by Congress’s codification of the common law of pat-
ent infringement, which prevents courts from fully relying on
theories of contributory tort liability in divided infringement cases
today.
II. THE PATENT ACT LIMITS THE IMPOSITION OF CONTRIBUTORY
TORT LIABILITY IN DIVIDED INFRINGEMENT CASES
Although the doctrine of contributory tort liability appears well-
suited to equitably resolve divided patent infringement lawsuits,
present-day courts are unable to fully rely on this body of law when
resolving these cases due to Congress’s narrow—and short-
sighted—codification of the law of patent infringement in the
Patent Act of 1952. This Part examines the restrictions imposed by
the Patent Act by first reviewing its codification of the law of in-
fringement, and then probing the ways in which that codification
limited the scope of the common law principle of contributory
infringement.
A. The Patent Act’s Codification of the Law of Patent Infringement
Congress codified the common law of patent infringement for
the first time in the Patent Act of 1952,55 creating a new statutory
provision, Section 271, to govern patent infringement.56 Subsection
271(a) defines the direct infringement of a patent, stating that
“whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention, within the United States or imports into the
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent
therefor, infringes the patent.”57 This provision thus, in effect, es-
tablishes a strict liability paradigm for direct infringement: a party
55. See, e.g., Neil F. DuChez, Note, Synopsis of the Extraterritorial Protection Afforded by Section
337 as Compared to the Patent Act, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 447, 449 (2008) (ex-
plaining that “the Patent Act of 1952 independently codified the common law of
infringement in Section 271(a)”); Steven W. Moore, Note, A Last Step Rule for Direct Infringe-
ment of Process Claims: Clarifying Indirect Infringement and Narrowing Joint Infringement, 61 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 827, 834 (2013) (noting that “the Patent Act . . . codified the common law patent
infringement doctrines at the time”); Su, supra note 23, at 610 (reporting that “patent in-
fringement law was codified for the first time in 1952”).
56. See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 23, at 209 (“First enacted in 1952, § 271(a) of the 1952
Patent Act codified the common law approach to patent infringement.”); Su, supra note 23,
at 610 (reporting that “patent infringement law was codified for the first time in 1952”).
57. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2010).
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can be held liable for infringement even if it was unaware of the
patent’s existence.58
Meanwhile, the Patent Act divided the common law doctrine of
contributory patent infringement into two separate provisions.59
The first, Section 271(b), holds a party liable for inducing another’s
infringement, declaring that “[w]hoever actively induces infringe-
ment of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”60 Put differently,
even if a party does not infringe a patent itself, under Section
271(b) it can still be held indirectly liable if it causes someone else’s
direct infringement.61 Inducement liability has arisen, for example,
in cases where a party designed the infringing activity carried out by
another,62 instructed or directed the infringing party’s actions,63 or
agreed to indemnify the infringing party from liability.64
Because the Patent Act speaks in terms of “active” inducement,
however, courts have traditionally required a showing that the in-
ducer knew of the patent-in-suit in order to impose liability under
Section 271(b).65 Moreover, because the provision only applies to
58. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(“[P]atent infringement is a strict liability offense.”); see also Roger D. Blair & Thomas F.
Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 800 (2002)
(“Patent infringement is a strict liability tort in the sense that a defendant may be liable
without having had any notice, prior to the filing of an infringement action, that her conduct
was infringing.”); Karthik Kumar, Note, Of Deep-Fryers and (Semiconductor) Chips: Why Ignorance
of a Patent is No Excuse for Its Indirect Infringement, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 727, 733 (2012) (“Direct
infringement is a strict liability tort: a defendant can be liable even without knowledge of the
patent’s existence.”).
59. See, e.g., Cristin Keegan, Comment, Using Old Ideas to Catch New Infringers: How Courts
Should Look to Patent Law to Apply Liability for Inducing Infringement, 36 SETON HALL L. REV.
1015, 1020 (2006) (“The Patent Act codified the common law concept of contributory in-
fringement and divided it into two categories: contributory infringement and inducing
infringement.”); Eric L. Lane, The Federal Circuit’s Inducement Conflict Resolution: The Flawed
Foundation and Ignored Implications of DSU Medical, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 198,
202 (2007) (“The goal of Congress in enacting the contributory infringement and induce-
ment sections of the Patent Act of 1952 was to codify the existing common law of
contributory infringement.”).
60. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2010).
61. See Long Truong, Note, After BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.: Conspiratorial
Infringement as a Means of Holding Joint Infringers Liable, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1897, 1905 (2009)
(reciting the requirements for inducement under Section 271(b)).
62. See Water Tech. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (imposing
inducement liability on the developer of an infringing system).
63. See Goodwall Const. Co., Inc. v. Beers Const. Co., 210 U.S.P.Q. 272, 1981 WL 40517
(N.D. Ga. 1981).
64. See H.B. Fuller Co. v. Nat’l Starch and Chemical Corp., 689 F. Supp. 923, 944–45 (D.
Minn. 1988); see also MOY, supra note 44, at § 15:17 (reciting cases).
65. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011); see also
Soonbok Lee, Note, Induced Infringement as a Strict Liability Claim: Abolishment of the Specific
Intent Requirement, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 381, 383 (2012) (noting that although
“§ 271(b) does not expressly mention any knowledge or intent of the inducer . . . courts
nevertheless have consistently required a certain level of specific intent of the inducer.”);
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the inducement of “infringement,” courts have also required a
plaintiff to show that someone else has directly infringed the pat-
ent—as defined by Section 271(a)—in order for inducement
liability to arise.66
Perhaps more significantly for present purposes, the Patent Act
also included a provision defining the “contributory” infringement
of a patent, limiting the concept to cases involving a specific fact
pattern set forth in Section 271(c).67 That provision states:
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or im-
ports into the United States a component of a patented
machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a ma-
terial or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the
same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an
infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or com-
modity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.68
Thus, Section 271(c) limits contributory infringement liability to
cases in which the defendant has assisted in another’s unauthorized
performance of a patent by selling a material component especially
made for use in the infringement.69 Like Section 271(b), however,
in order to prevail on a claim of contributory infringement the pat-
ent-holder must show both (i) that someone else directly infringed
the patent,70 and (ii) that the defendant knowingly contributed a
Mathew Lowrie, Kevin M. Littman & Lucas Silva, The Changing Landscape of Joint, Divided and
Indirect Infringement—The State of the Law and How to Address It, 12 J. HIGH TECH. L. 65 (2011)
(stating that plaintiffs “must be able to show that the defendant at least knew of the patent”
in an inducement case).
66. See Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Tech., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117 (2014)
(holding that inducement liability under Section 271(b) must be predicated on a direct in-
fringement of the patent as specified under Section 271(a)).
67. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2010).
68. Id.
69. See generally id.; see also Daniel Harris Brean, Asserting Patents to Combat Infringement Via
3D Printing: It’s No “Use”, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 771, 794 (2013)
(“[C]ontributory infringement under subsection (c) requires provision of material compo-
nents to another for incorporation into an infringing product with knowledge ‘that the
combination for which [the] component was especially designed was both patented and in-
fringing.’”); Report, A Lawyer’s Ramble Down the Information Superhighway, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
697, 726 (1995) (reporting that “one who sells material components of a patented invention
within the United States, with knowledge of the components’ intended infringing use, is
liable for contributory infringement unless the item is ‘a staple article . . . of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use.’”).
70. See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341 (1961)
(Aro I) (stating “it is settled that if there is no direct infringement of a patent there can be no
contributory infringement”); see also Andrea Sloan Pink, Comment, Copyright Infringement Post
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component to this infringement while being aware of the patent-in-
suit.71
So, for example, under Section 271(c) the manufacturer of a gas
fireplace component has been held liable for contributory infringe-
ment when the part it sold had no substantial use beyond its
inclusion in a patented fireplace burner assembly.72 At the same
time, however, merely performing one or more steps of a patented
process—as in the typical divided infringement case—would not
give rise to a finding of contributory infringement under Section
271(c) unless the defendant supplied a material component in or-
der to help facilitate another’s direct infringement of an entire
patented claim.
To understand why Congress drafted Section 271(c) in such a
narrow manner requires a brief review of the continued evolution
of the common law doctrine of contributory infringement through-
out the first half of the 1900s. Around the turn of the twentieth
century, patentees began to realize that they could potentially use
the threat of contributory infringement liability to expand their pat-
ent monopolies by requiring that their customers only use
authorized, but unpatentable, component parts with a patented
machine.73 In the 1896 case of Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co.
v. Eureka Specialty Co.,74 for example, the owner of a patent covering
a machine that used staples to attach buttons to shoes prohibited its
customers from using other companies’ fasteners in its device.75
Even though the staples themselves were not patented, the patent-
holder sued a competitor for contributory infringement when it be-
gan to sell fasteners for use in the patentee’s machine.76
Isoquantic Shift: Should Bulletin Board Services Be Liable?, 43 UCLA L. REV. 587, 621 (1995)
(reciting the traditional rule that “[e]very act of contributory infringement requires that
there be a direct infringement by another.”).
71. See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488 (1964)
(Aro II) (explaining that “a majority of the Court is of the view that § 271(c) does require a
showing that the alleged contributory infringer knew that the combination for which his
component was especially designed was both patented and infringing.”); see also Jennifer K.
Bush, John E. Gartman, & Elizabeth I. Rogers, Six Patent Law Puzzlers, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 1, 32 (2004) (noting that “[t]he statutory provision for contributory infringement con-
tains an explicit knowledge requirement which the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have
construed to require knowledge of the patent.”).
72. Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
73. See Adams, supra note 46, at 376–77 (discussing the development of using arrange-
ments to extend patent monopolies in the early 1900s).
74. 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896).
75. Id. at 290.
76. Id. at 289; see also Adams, supra note 46, at 377 (discussing case).
FALL 2016] Resolving the Divided Patent Infringement Dilemma 17
Courts were initially willing to impose contributory infringement
liability in these cases.77 The Supreme Court eventually rejected this
interpretation of the doctrine, however, in Motion Pictures Patents
Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co.,78 a 1917 case involving the
use of a patented film projector to display movies produced by an
unauthorized film studio.79 In particular, the Court determined
that it would be improper to allow a patentee to “extend the scope
of its patent monopoly by restricting the use of it to materials neces-
sary in its operation but which are no part of the patented
invention . . . .”80 The Supreme Court later expanded this holding
in 1931,81 ruling that any attempt to extend a patent monopoly to
an unpatented component part in such a manner was beyond the
legitimate scope of the patent owner’s monopoly and resulted in
the patent owner thereafter being barred from ever again asserting
the patent in an infringement action.82
The Court continued to develop this theory of patent misuse into
the 1940s, which culminated in the 1944 case of Mercoid Corp. v.
Mid-Continent Investment Co.83 Mercoid involved a patent for a home
heating system that used a combustion stoker switch to prevent fire
from escaping a furnace once the thermostat had reached the de-
sired temperature.84 The patentee accused the defendant of
contributory infringement after the defendant sold unauthorized
stoker switches for use in the plaintiff’s patented system.85 However,
unlike the Button-Fastener and Motion Picture Patents cases discussed
above—which involved the sale of unpatented, so-called “staple”
items of commerce capable of other non-infringing uses—the ac-
cused stoker switch in Mercoid could not be used in any way other
77. See, e.g., Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912); Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor
Talking Machine Co., 213 U.S. 325 (1909); National Phonograph Co. v. Schlegel, 128 F. 733
(8th Cir. 1904); Rupp & Wittgenfeld Co. v. Elliott, 131 F. 730 (6th Cir. 1904); Cortelyou v.
Lowe, 111 F. 1005 (2d Cir. 1901); Dickerson v. Matheson, 57 F. 524 (2d Cir. 1893); Edison
Phonograph Co v. Kaufmann, 105 F. 960 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1901); Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v.
O’Brien, 93 F. 200 (C.C.D. Mass. 1898); see also MOY, supra note 44, at § 15:5 (discussing
evolution of the doctrine of contributory patent infringement).
78. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
79. Id. at 506–07.
80. Id. at 516.
81. Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
82. See MOY supra note 44, at § 15:8 (discussing the implications of patent misuse follow-
ing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Carbice).
83. 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
84. Id. at 664 (“The patent is a combination or system patent, covering a domestic heat-
ing system which comprises three main elements—a motor driven stoker for feeding fuel to
the combustion chamber of a furnace, a room thermostat for controlling the feeding of fuel,
and a combustion stoker switch to prevent extinguishment of the fire.”).
85. Id. (“[Mercoid] manufactured and sold combustion stoker switches for use in the
Cross combination patent”).
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than as part of the patented system.86 This brought the case more
closely in line with the original contributory infringement suits—
like the oil lamp case of Wallace v. Holmes—decided back in the
1800s.87 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled that the patentee in
Mercoid had engaged in patent misuse by seeking to hold the com-
petitor contributorily liable for selling the component part.88 As a
result, the Mercoid decision effectively eradicated the doctrine of
contributory infringement from the patent landscape.89
Section 271(c) was intended to overturn Mercoid and restore the
doctrine of contributory infringement liability back to its pre-1944
roots.90 This explains the narrow focus of the provision. Congress
specifically limited the imposition of contributory infringement lia-
bility in Section 271(c) to cases involving the sale of component
parts of a patented invention because that was the most pressing
form of contributory infringement at issue at the time.91 Indeed, as
the House and Senate Report accompanying the bill that would be-
come the Patent Act clearly explained, Section 271(c) was
“concerned with the usual situation in which contributory infringe-
ment arises.”92
B. The Patent Act Limited the Scope of Contributory
Infringement Liability
Taken together, the Patent Act’s two provisions codifying the
common law of contributory infringement no longer permit courts
86. Id. (stating that “we may assume that Mercoid did not act innocently” since “the
Circuit Court of Appeals said that it could find no use for the accused devices other than in
the Cross combination patent.”).
87. See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text (discussing the early contributory in-
fringement cases of Renwick v. Pond and Wallace v. Holmes).
88. Mercoid, 320 U.S. at 667 (finding that “it makes no difference that the unpatented
device is part of the patented whole” when considering whether patent misuse had
occurred).
89. See Adams, supra note 46, at 382 (explaining that “the Supreme Court used the pat-
ent misuse defense to in effect eradicate the doctrine of contributory infringement”).
90. See Akamai Tech., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 786 F.3d 899, 922 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (Moore, J. dissenting) (noting that “the 1952 Patent Act was” intended to “restore
notions of infringement which had been curtailed by the Supreme Court’s decisions in [Mer-
coid]); see also Alfred P. Ewert & Irah H. Donner, Will the New Information Superhighway Create
“Super” Problems for Software Engineers? Contributory Infringement of Patented or Copyrighted
Software-Related Applications, 4 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 155, 167 (1994) (stating that “Congress
came to the rescue with the Patent Act by including § 271(c) and (d) which define contribu-
tory infringement and limit application of the misuse doctrine, effectively overruling the
Mercoid decision”).
91. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2010).
92. S. Rep. No. 82-1979 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2402.
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to apply the underlying tort doctrine as broadly as would have origi-
nally been allowable at common law.93 The tort doctrine of
contributory liability allowed courts to hold two or more parties lia-
ble whenever they knowingly worked together to injure a plaintiff,94
even if each of the defendant’s individual actions alone were not
themselves actionable.95 Conversely, under Sections 271(b) and (c),
courts can only impose liability in cases where one party directly
infringes the patent-in-suit. Under Section 271(b), for instance, a
party can only be held liable for inducement when it encourages or
supports another’s direct infringement of the patent.96 Meanwhile,
because Section 271(c) only applies to parties who sell component
parts for use in another’s infringement, it too does not cover cases
in which two parties collectively infringe a patent, but in which
neither party acting alone performs all of the patented steps.
As a result, the Patent Act’s limited and shortsighted codification
of the doctrine of contributory infringement restricts the potential
applicability of the common law principle in significant ways. Most
importantly for present purposes, Section 271(c) prevents courts
from imposing contributory liability in divided patent infringement
lawsuits to the full extent that would have been allowable at com-
mon law. As noted above, contributory tort liability was particularly
well-suited for equitably resolving divided infringement lawsuits.97
Not only does the tort doctrine of contributory liability apply to the
collective and wrongful conduct of two or more parties—it includes
a knowledge component as well.98 Thus, unlike the strict liability
regime for direct patent infringement imposed by Section 271(a),
at common law contributory tort liability could only arise when a
93. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text (summarizing the common law tort
doctrine of contributory liability).
94. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (summarizing contributory liability at
common law).
95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1979) (explaining that “[e]ach of two
or more persons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single and indivisible harm to
the injured party” is subject to liability for the entire harm); see also Oswald, supra note 1, at
18 (stating that contributory tort liability “is tempered by a ‘culpability requirement’ that
considers ‘whether a reasonable person, standing in the shoes of the defendant, would have
been aware of the misdeeds of another’”) (quoting Mark Bartholomew, Copyright, Trademark
and Secondary Liability After Grokster, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 465 (2009)).
96. See Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Tech., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117 (2014)
(holding that inducement liability under Section 271(b) must be predicated on a direct in-
fringement of the patent as specified under Section 271(a)).
97. See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text (discussing the potential applicability
of contributory tort liability doctrine to divided patent infringement lawsuits).
98. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text (considering the benefits of importing
the knowledge requirement from contributory tort liability into divided infringement
litigation).
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defendant was reasonably aware that her actions were being com-
bined with those of another to injure the plaintiff.
This knowledge requirement would have added a critically im-
portant element in cases of divided infringement. Indeed, resolving
divided infringement lawsuits under the current framework for di-
rect infringement—as specified in Section 271(a)—raises
significant notice concerns, as it could potentially hold defendants
strictly liable for participating in an infringement even though they
had no idea that their otherwise innocent actions were being com-
bined with those of another party to complete all of the steps of a
patented method.99
Take, for example, the average Internet user. Anyone who uses
the Internet may have, at one point or another, unwittingly contrib-
uted to the divided infringement of a patented method through
their interactions with a website.100 Under a strict liability regime—
in which parties would be liable for infringement anytime their
combined actions infringed a patent—these Internet users could
find themselves held jointly liable for the direct infringement of the
patent even though they had no idea that they were contributing to
its infringement.101 Adding the knowledge component of the com-
mon law doctrine of contributory tort liability would serve to
eliminate that concern in divided infringement cases.
At the same time, however, any standard limiting divided in-
fringement liability to cases in which a single party performs the
entire method itself—either directly or vicariously—inevitably al-
lows parties to intentionally circumvent patent protection by
deliberately dividing the performance of a patent method between
itself and another party operating at arms-length (such as a website
and its users).102 The common law doctrine of contributory tort lia-
bility would account for this concern as well, imposing liability only
in cases where a party knowingly collaborates with someone else to
infringe a patent.
99. See Akamai Tech., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1307 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014) (“Because direct infringement
is a strict liability tort, it has been thought that extending liability in that manner would
ensnare actors who did not themselves commit all the acts necessary to constitute infringe-
ment and who had no way of knowing that others were acting in a way that rendered their
collective conduct infringing.”); Deep9 Corp. v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., Case No. C11-0035JLR,
2012 WL 4336726, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 21, 2012) (citing the same language).
100. See Grow, supra note 10, at 111 (noting that those using the Internet could poten-
tially be participating in “the unauthorized performance of a patented method”).
101. See id.
102. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (noting that parties may be able to structure
their activities to avoid patent infringement liability).
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Unfortunately, even though contributory tort liability would have
equitably resolved the competing policy concerns presented by di-
vided infringement, courts can no longer rely on this common law
doctrine following the Patent Act’s codification of the law of con-
tributory infringement, as Sections 271(b) and (c) effectively
displaced it.103 As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, a federal
statute preempts the common law whenever “the legislative scheme
‘[speaks] directly to [the] question’” at issue in the case.104 Con-
gress need not “affirmatively proscribe[ ] the use of . . . common
law” in order to displace the common law principle.105 Instead,
whenever a statute directly addresses an issue, courts may not “‘sup-
plement’ Congress’ answer so thoroughly that the [statute]
becomes meaningless.”106
Applying this precedent to the Patent Act, Section 271(c) clearly
speaks to the question of when contributory patent infringement
liability may arise. And, as noted above,107 this contributory in-
fringement provision has significantly limited the scope of the
underlying common law tort doctrine, by requiring not only a show-
ing that someone else has directly infringed the patent, but also
that the contributory infringer specifically sold a material compo-
nent especially made for use in the underlying infringement.
Similarly, Section 271(b)—the provision governing induced in-
fringement—also requires that an underlying act of direct
infringement have occurred in order for inducement liability to
arise.108 Therefore, neither of the provisions codifying the common
law of contributory infringement permits a defendant to be held
liable for inducing or contributing to an infringement through the
performance of some, but not all, of the steps of a patent claim
unless someone else has directly infringed the entire patented
invention.
Although courts have often said that the Patent Act’s codification
of the law of infringement was intended to preserve the pre-existing
103. See Akamai Tech., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 786 F.3d 899, 911 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (stating that “joint tortfeasor law and § 271 are fundamentally incompatible”).
104. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higgin-
botham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)); see also Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 184 (1994) (“The fact that Congress chose to impose some
forms of secondary liability, but not others, indicates a deliberate congressional choice with
which the courts should not interfere.”).
105. Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 315.
106. Mobil Oil, 436 U.S. at 625.
107. See supra notes 67–71 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for liabil-
ity to arise under Section 271(c)).
108. See Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Tech., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117 (2014)
(holding that inducement liability under Section 271(b) must be predicated on a direct in-
fringement of the patent as specified under Section 271(a)).
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common law doctrine,109 this is not entirely correct. Sections 271(b)
and (c) have limited the common law principle of contributory in-
fringement liability in important but heretofore not fully
recognized ways. Indeed, Congress itself clearly expressed its intent
to limit the common law doctrine in the House and Senate report
accompanying the bill that would become the Patent Act, noting
that Sections 271(b) and (c) were meant to “define and limit [the]
contributory infringement of a patent.”110 As a result, courts can no
longer utilize the underlying traditional tort doctrine to its full his-
toric extent when resolving cases of divided patent infringement
today.
Consequently, the Patent Act substantially impairs the ability of
courts to deal with cases of divided patent infringement. Because
the full breadth of the common law tort doctrine of contributory
liability cannot be relied on to resolve divided infringement law-
suits, courts have found it increasingly difficult—if not impossible—
to equitably balance the competing policy issues at stake when de-
ciding these cases.
III. COURTS HAVE STRUGGLED TO RESOLVE DIVIDED INFRINGEMENT
CASES UNDER THE PATENT ACT
Unable to rely on the common law doctrine best suited for
resolving divided patent infringement lawsuits, courts have instead
formulated a series of ever-changing, conflicting standards in hopes
of equitably resolving these cases under the Patent Act. Indeed, the
difficulty that divided infringement poses for the judiciary under
the existing statutory framework is perhaps best illustrated by the
fact that the Federal Circuit—the nation’s primary appellate patent
court—has itself adopted six different standards in these cases in
the last decade alone. Unfortunately, none of the standards devel-
oped to date is entirely satisfactory, as each either is inconsistent
with the common law of infringement (as codified in the Patent
Act), or fails to strike an adequate balance between protecting
109. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 485–86 n.6
(1964) (Aro II) (stating that Section 271(c) “was designed to ‘codify in statutory form princi-
ples of contributory infringement’ which had been ‘part of our law for about 80 years’”)
(citing H. R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 9 (1952)); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909
F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The legislative history of the Patent Act indicates that no
substantive change in the scope of what constituted ‘contributory infringement’ was in-
tended by the enactment of § 271.”).
110. S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 21 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2421 (em-
phasis added).
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those who are unaware of their partial involvement in an infringe-
ment while still imposing liability on parties who knowingly divide
the performance of an infringing method among themselves.
A. The Federal Circuit’s Initial and Conflicting Divided
Infringement Precedents
The Federal Circuit first addressed divided infringement in the
2005 case of Cross Medical Products, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamore Danek,
Inc.111 There, a panel of the Federal Circuit refused to hold a manu-
facturer of orthopedic implants liable for infringement, finding
that at least one step of the asserted patent claim—which required
that the patented implant be attached to a patient’s spine—was per-
formed by surgeons, rather than the defendant manufacturer.
Implicitly drawing upon the common law doctrine of vicarious lia-
bility,112 the court adopted what appeared to be an agency-based
standard for divided infringement, stating that because the “sur-
geons . . . are, as far as we can tell, not agents of Medtronic,” it
would be inappropriate to hold the defendant liable for their in-
fringing acts.113
Several months later, however, a separate panel of the Federal
Circuit endorsed a very different standard for divided infringement
in On Demand Machine Corp. v. Ingram Industries, Inc.114 After revers-
ing the lower court’s finding that the defendant had infringed a
patent relating to on-demand book publishing on claim construc-
tion grounds,115 the On Demand court’s decision went on to include
dicta regarding the divided infringement issue. The court began by
quoting the trial court’s jury instructions, which specified that
“[w]hen infringement results from the participation and combined
action(s) of more than one person or entity, they are all joint in-
fringers and jointly liable for patent infringement.”116 Although
such a standard would have significantly exceeded the conditions in
which courts imposed vicarious or contributory liability at common
111. 424 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
112. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text (explaining that courts at common law
imposed vicarious infringement liability when one party served as the agent of another).
113. Cross Medical Products, 424 F.3d at 1311.
114. 442 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
115. The Federal Circuit reversed the trial court’s finding of infringement cased on a
claim construction issue; see id. at 1345 (concluding that “no reasonable jury could find in-
fringement, on the correct claim construction”).
116. Id. at 1344–45.
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law117—imposing liability on any party who unwittingly performed
one step of an infringing process, regardless of their knowledge or
intent—the panel in On Demand nevertheless stated that it “dis-
cern[ed] no flaw in this instruction as a statement of law.”118
Still not satisfied, a third Federal Circuit panel adopted yet an-
other divided infringement standard the next year in BMC
Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.119 BMC Resources involved a pat-
ented method for processing debit banking transactions, which
explicitly included steps to be performed by (i) a bank customer,
(ii) a third-party billing processor, and (iii) a financial institution.120
The BMC Resources panel began by rejecting the plaintiff’s assertion
that On Demand had endorsed a broad standard for liability in di-
vided infringement cases, instead characterizing the prior panel’s
discussion of the issue as nothing more than dictum, reached “with-
out any analysis of the issues presented relating to divided
infringement.”121
The BMC Resources panel opted to adhere to the traditional com-
mon law doctrine of vicarious liability,122 holding that cases of
divided infringement required a showing that either the alleged in-
fringers had entered into an agency relationship or that one of the
parties exhibited sufficient “direction or control” over the other’s
activities such that all of the acts could be fairly attributed to the
“mastermind” party.123 Although the panel recognized that such a
standard could “allow parties to enter into arms-length agreements
to avoid infringement” liability in some cases,124 it nevertheless justi-
fied the limitation on policy grounds in order to avoid holding
unwitting parties strictly liable for the divided infringement of a
patent.125
The Federal Circuit reaffirmed and clarified this approach the
following year in Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp.,126 which in-
volved a patented process covering the interactions of various
117. See supra notes 31–32 and 36–38 and accompanying text (reciting the common law
standards for vicarious and contributory liability).
118. Id. at 1345.
119. 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
120. Id. at 1375.
121. Id. at 1380.
122. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text (explaining that courts at common law
imposed vicarious infringement liability when one party served as the agent of another).
123. BMC Resources v. Payment Tech., L.P., 498 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
124. Id.
125. Id. (stating that the concern of intentional circumvention “does not outweigh con-
cerns over expanding the rules governing direct infringement”).
126. 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
FALL 2016] Resolving the Divided Patent Infringement Dilemma 25
parties participating in municipal bond auctions held over the In-
ternet.127 In Muniauction, the plaintiff had argued that the BMC
Resources standard for divided infringement cases had been satis-
fied, emphasizing that the defendant controlled its users’ “access to
[the infringing auction] system and instruct[ed] bidders on” how
to perform the infringing steps.128 The Muniauction panel disagreed
and held that merely instructing customers on how to perform the
infringing acts was not sufficient to impose vicarious liability at com-
mon law.129 Thus, the Muniauction panel appeared to suggest that a
more legally binding form of control over all of the infringing acts
was necessary to support a finding of direct infringement.
The BMC Resources and Muniauction courts’ emphasis on com-
mon law vicarious liability theories—e.g., the so-called “direction or
control” standard—was generally consistent with the Patent Act’s
partial codification of the common law of infringement in Section
271. Courts at common law only held a party directly liable for an-
other’s infringing acts in cases where the second party effectively
operated as an agent of the first.130 Meanwhile, common law courts
turned to the doctrine of contributory liability in cases where all of
the requisite infringing steps were not legally attributable to a sin-
gle defendant,131 a doctrine that was subsequently incorporated
into the Patent Act in later subsections of Section 271.132 Thus, be-
cause the doctrine of contributory infringement was codified in
different provisions of the Patent Act—subsections that require
proof of another party’s underlying direct infringement of the pat-
ent133—it is reasonable to conclude that Congress intended that
direct infringement liability under Section 271(a) would only arise
in cases where a single party either performed all of the infringing
acts itself or was vicariously responsible for another’s activities.
Nevertheless, some judges on the Federal Circuit soon expressed
their dissatisfaction with the court’s new divided infringement rule.
127. Id. at 1321.
128. Id. at 1330.
129. Id. (“[T]he control or direction standard is satisfied in situations where the law
would traditionally hold the accused direct infringer vicariously liable for the acts committed
by another party that are required to complete performance of a claimed method.”).
130. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text (discussing common law courts’ reli-
ance on vicarious liability doctrine in patent infringement lawsuits).
131. See supra notes 36–49 and accompanying text (discussing the application of contribu-
tory infringement liability at common law).
132. See supra notes 59–71 and accompanying text (explaining that contributory liability
was divided into two provisions in the Patent Act, Sections 271(b) and (c)).
133. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (noting that contributory infringement
liability requires a showing of an underlying act of direct infringement under Sections 271(a)
of the Patent Act).
26 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 50:1
Indeed, as Muniauction illustrates, even if a would-be infringer spe-
cifically instructed its customers on how to perform several of the
infringing acts, that still would not be enough for liability to arise
under the BMC Resources standard for divided infringement. In-
stead, in those circumstances it appeared that a defendant would
only be liable for direct infringement if its customers were, in ef-
fect, acting as its agents, with a contractual obligation to perform
the infringing steps subject to the defendant’s control.134 Thus,
BMC Resources and Muniauction created a potential loophole that
would-be infringers could easily exploit to avoid infringement
liability.
As a result, several judges on the Federal Circuit began to voice
their concern over the BMC Resources and Muniauction courts’ direc-
tion or control standard. In Golden Hour Data Systems, Inc. v.
emsCharts, Inc.,135 for instance, Judge Newman issued a dissent con-
tending that the direction or control standard was “incorrect as a
matter of law.”136 She harkened for a return to the standard for
divided infringement endorsed in On Demand and argued that de-
fendants should be held jointly liable for infringing a patent
whenever they “combined their procedures into an integrated sys-
tem that met all of the limitations of [the asserted patent]
claims.”137 Similarly, in McKesson Technologies, Inc. v. Epic Systems
Corp., although Judge Bryson acknowledged that the trial court cor-
rectly applied the BMC Resources and Muniauction standard, he
nevertheless questioned whether those decisions had been properly
decided and encouraged the entire Federal Circuit to take the mat-
ter up en banc.138
134. See Jingyuan Luo, Shining the Limelight on Divided Infringement: Emerging Technologies
and the Liability Loophole, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 675, 687 (2015) (noting that under BMC
Resources and Muniauction, “[a]bsent proof that defendants had either an agency relationship
or contractual obligations with another party performing some of the infringing steps, courts
[were] reluctant to find liability for divided infringement”).
135. 614 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
136. Id. at 1383 (Newman, J., dissenting).
137. Id.
138. Case No. 2010-1291, at *1 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Bryson, J., concurring), http://
law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/10-1291/10-1291-2011-04-12.html (“I
agree that the decision in this case is correct in light of this court’s decisions in BMC Resources
[and] Muniauction. . . . Whether those decisions are correct is another question, one that is
close enough and important enough that it may warrant review by the en banc court in an
appropriate case.”).
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B. Akamai I
The Federal Circuit heeded Judge Bryson’s call for en banc re-
view of BMC Resources and Muniauction in Akamai Technologies, Inc. v.
Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai I), which resulted in yet another
new standard for divided infringement.139 In Akamai, a panel of the
Federal Circuit had initially held that the plaintiff had not suffi-
ciently shown that the defendant directed and controlled its
customers’ involvement in the alleged divided infringement of pat-
ents relating to the storage and expedited transfer of multimedia
files—such as photos or videos—over the Internet.140
The en banc majority began its opinion in Akamai I by discussing
the policy rationale supporting the BMC Resources direction or con-
trol standard for divided infringement. In particular, the court
justified its reliance on the traditional common law principle of vi-
carious liability:
Because direct infringement is a strict liability tort, it has been
thought that extending liability [to multiple independent par-
ties collectively performing the steps of a method claim] would
ensnare actors who did not themselves commit all the acts nec-
essary to constitute infringement and who had no way of
knowing that others were acting in a way that rendered their
collective conduct infringing.141
The en banc majority found that the BMC Resources requirement
that the plaintiff show sufficient direction or control—rising to the
level of creating a binding contractual or agency relationship—
helped to alleviate this concern by rendering all of the infringing
acts fairly attributable to the mastermind party.142 As a result, a ma-
jority of the Akamai I en banc court opted to preserve the existing
139. 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The Akamai I case was technically a combined en
banc appeal, with the court also granting an en banc appeal in the McKesson case as well.
McKesson Tech. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 463 F. App’x 906, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The parties in
McKesson reached a settlement following the Federal Circuit’s en banc ruling, while the par-
ties in Akamai have continued to litigate the case. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. McKesson Tech., Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 1520 (2013) (dismissing the petition for writ of certiorari in McKesson following
settlement).
140. Akamai Tech., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010), see
also Akamai Tech., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 90, 96 (D. Mass. 2009)
(describing the patents at issue in the case).
141. Akamai I, 692 F.3d at 1307.
142. See id. (concluding that liability is warranted in cases where one party vicariously
controls another’s infringing acts).
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standard for liability in divided infringement cases brought under
Section 271(a)—the Patent Act’s direct infringement provision.143
After upholding the BMC Resources standard for direct infringe-
ment, however, the en banc majority in Akamai I went on to look to
a different provision in the Patent Act to address cases of divided
infringement that did not rise to the level of a Section 271(a) viola-
tion. In particular, the court believed that Section 271(b)—the
Patent Act’s inducement provision—was particularly well-suited to
handle cases of divided infringement. Not only did it apply to cases
in which one party “advises, encourages, or otherwise induces
others to engage in infringing conduct,”144 but it also required that
the “inducer act with knowledge that the induced acts constitute
patent infringement,” thereby alleviating the innocent infringer
concerns triggered by Section 271(a)’s strict liability regime.145
Notwithstanding these potential advantages, the majority’s hopes
of using Section 271(b) to resolve the problems posed by divided
infringement faced a significant hurdle. Specifically, as noted
above,146 courts have traditionally required patentees to show that
someone else has directly infringed a patent under Section 271(a)
before inducement liability will arise. Because the Akamai I en banc
majority had just affirmed that direct infringement liability still re-
quired a showing that one party had performed all of the infringing
steps itself—either directly or vicariously—this underlying require-
ment seemingly foreclosed the possibility of relying on inducement
liability to address acts of divided infringement that did not rise to
the level of a Section 271(a) violation.
The en banc majority tried to sidestep this issue by adopting a
new meaning of what it took to “infringe” a patent for purposes of
Section 271(b). Although the majority opinion acknowledged that
inducement liability had always been premised on a showing “that
there has been direct infringement,” it argued that this was “not the
same as requiring proof that a single party would be liable as a di-
rect infringer.”147 Put differently, the court held that even though
“all of the steps of a claimed method must be performed in order to
find induced infringement . . . it is not necessary to prove that all
143. Id. (“Because the reasoning of our decision today is not predicated on the doctrine
of direct infringement, we have no occasion at this time to revisit any of those principles
regarding the law of divided infringement as it applies to liability for direct infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).”).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1308.
146. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional interpretation of
inducement liability under Section 271(b)).
147. Akamai I, 692 F.3d at 1308–09.
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the steps were committed by a single entity.”148 Thus, Akamai I effec-
tively redefined the term “infringement” for purposes of Section
271(b). Whereas all of the infringing acts must be attributable to a
single party in order for direct infringement liability to arise under
Section 271(a), the en banc majority was willing to impose induce-
ment liability under Section 271(b) in cases where a party
knowingly divides the performance of the infringing steps with
another.149
Considering the novelty of the Akamai I en banc majority’s rein-
terpretation of inducement liability under Section 271(b), it was
neither surprising that the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari
in the case,150 nor that a unanimous Court ultimately reversed the
Federal Circuit’s decision.151 The Supreme Court began its opinion
by noting the long-standing rule that “liability for inducement must
be predicated on direct infringement.”152 Although the en banc ma-
jority of the Federal Circuit had asserted that this underlying
“infringement” could be defined differently for purposes of Sec-
tions 271(a) and (b), the Court rejected such a distinction, stating
that “[t]he Federal Circuit’s analysis fundamentally misunderstands
what it means to infringe a method patent.”153
Instead, the Supreme Court held that inducement liability must
be premised on a finding of direct infringement as defined in Sec-
tion 271(a).154 Otherwise, courts would be required “to develop two
148. Id. at 1306.
149. See id. at 1318 (reciting the new standard for inducement liability). The Akamai I
majority justified its new interpretation of inducement by arguing that:
Nothing in the text indicates that the term “infringement” in section 271(b) is limited
to “infringement” by a single entity. Rather, “infringement” in this context appears to
refer most naturally to the acts necessary to infringe a patent, not to whether those
acts are performed by one entity or several.
Id. at 1309. Moreover, the en banc majority asserted, “[i]t would be a bizarre result to hold
someone liable for inducing another to perform all of the steps of a method claim, but to
hold harmless one who goes further by actually performing some of the steps himself.” Id. In
addition, the majority also asserted that the legislative history of the Patent Act supported its
new inducement standard, emphasizing testimony from Giles Rich, one of the drafters of the
Patent Act, which suggested that contributory liability would arise at common law in cases
where “there is no direct infringer of the patent but only two contributory infringers.” Id. at
1310.
150. Limelight Networks Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 895 (2014).
151. Limelight Networks Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).
152. Id. at 2117.
153. Id.
154. Id. (“[W]here there has been no direct infringement, there can be no inducement
of infringement under § 271(b).”).
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parallel bodies of infringement law: one for liability for direct in-
fringement, and one for liability for inducement.”155 And because
the Federal Circuit in Akamai I had once again affirmed the re-
quirement that all infringing acts must be attributable to a single
party under Section 271(a)—a standard that the Supreme Court
“[a]ssumed without deciding . . . is correct”—there could be no
finding of inducement in the case.156
C. Akamai II
The Federal Circuit continued to modify its divided infringe-
ment standard on remand in Akamai II. First, a panel of the Federal
Circuit began by once again affirming the BMC Resources “direction
and control” standard for divided infringement under Section
271(a).157 This time, however, in addition to suits involving an
agency relationship, or those featuring a binding contractual re-
quirement to perform an infringing step, the Akamai II panel
suggested that vicarious liability could also arise in cases where the
divided infringers had formed a “joint enterprise.”158 As the court
explained:
A joint enterprise exists . . . when there is: (1) an agreement,
express or implied, among the members of the group; (2) a
common purpose to be carried out by the group; (3) a com-
munity of pecuniary interest in that purpose, among the
members, and (4) an equal right to a voice in the direction of
the enterprise, which gives an equal right of control.159
Contrary to the Akamai II panel’s hope that joint enterprise the-
ory would help resolve the divided infringement dilemma, however,
the Patent Act’s codification of contributory infringement liability
prevents courts from properly relying on this doctrine. Indeed, the
155. Id. at 2118.
156. Id. at 2117 (“[T]here has simply been no infringement of the method in which re-
spondents have staked out an interest, because the performance of all the patent’s steps is
not attributable to any one person”).
157. Akamai Tech., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 786 F.3d 899 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(Akamai II).
158. See id. at 910 (“Turning to the scope of vicarious liability, the vicarious liability test
includes, for example, principal-agent relationships, contractual arrangements, and joint
enterprises.”).
159. Id. at 911 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 491, cmt. c (1979)).
FALL 2016] Resolving the Divided Patent Infringement Dilemma 31
common law doctrine of joint enterprise is itself a subset of contrib-
utory tort liability law,160 and therefore was displaced by Congress’s
codification of the law of contributory infringement liability in Sec-
tions 271(b) and (c).161 In any event, since joint enterprise liability
requires that each of the participants in the enterprise possess “an
equal right of control” over the all of the infringing steps,162 the
doctrine would not apply to many of the most common cases of
divided infringement—namely, those in which the infringing par-
ties do not equally possess the power to control the infringing
activities (such as those cases in which either the parties work to-
gether at arms-length, or a service provider instructs its customers
on how to use its system on a take-it-or-leave-it basis). Thus, even if
courts could properly rely on joint enterprise doctrine in divided
infringement cases, this doctrine would do relatively little to pre-
vent parties intent on circumventing infringement liability from
doing so.
Although the Akamai II panel modestly expanded the scope of
divided infringement liability following the Supreme Court’s re-
mand, the full Federal Circuit nevertheless opted to once again
take up the issue en banc.163 And, despite the deep divisions that
had previously separated the court’s judges on the issue, the en
banc Federal Circuit surprisingly reached a unanimous per curiam
opinion restating the law of divided infringement164—thus provid-
ing its sixth standard in less than a decade.
The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Akamai II began by re-
affirming the requirement delineated in BMC Resources that in
order for direct infringement liability to arise under Section 271(a),
“all steps of a claimed method [must be] performed by or [be] at-
tributable to a single entity.”165 The court then stated that there are
two circumstances in which one entity may be held legally liable for
infringing acts performed by another party: “(1) where that entity
160. The Restatement provision relied on by the Akamai panel, for instance, is contained
within Chapter 17 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, entitled “Contributory Negli-
gence.” See Akamai, 786 F.3d at 910–11 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 491
(1979)).
161. See supra notes 103–110 and accompanying text (discussing the Patent Act’s displace-
ment of common law contributory liability doctrine).
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 491, cmt. c (1979).
163. Akamai Tech., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 612 F. App’x. 617 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(granting en banc rehearing).
164. Akamai Tech., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(“[W]e unanimously set forth the law of divided infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).”).
165. Id.
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directs or controls [the other party’s] performance, and (2) where
the actors form a joint enterprise.”166
Although the court’s recitation of the standard for divided in-
fringement was nearly identical to that of the Akamai II panel up to
this point, it diverged from its predecessor when it came to identify-
ing the circumstances in which vicarious liability may arise under
the direction or control standard. In addition to reiterating that a
defendant can be held vicariously liable for either (i) the infringing
acts of its agent, or (ii) those of a party under contract to specifi-
cally perform one or more steps of a patented method—as had
been specified in BMC Resources and Muniauction—the en banc
court added a third condition in which vicarious liability could ap-
ply in divided infringement cases.167
Specifically, the court held that vicarious liability would also arise
“when an alleged infringer conditions participation in an activity or
receipt of a benefit upon the performance of a step or steps of a
patented method and establishes the manner or timing of that per-
formance.”168 Such a standard would thus presumably extend
vicarious liability to cases like that of Muniauction, in which a defen-
dant’s customers freely elected to perform one or more infringing
steps pursuant to the defendant’s instruction.169
Unfortunately, the Akamai II en banc court’s expansion of vicari-
ous liability is once again at odds with the underlying common law
doctrine. The tort doctrine of vicarious liability—as incorporated
by the Patent Act170—is itself closely intertwined with the law of
agency.171 Agency law, in turn, only imposes liability on a party for
the acts of another when the two have formed a principal-agent
relationship.172 Importantly, merely allowing another party to act in
a particular manner does not establish a principal-agent relation-
ship at common law.173 Instead, courts typically require that the
principal expressly manifest its assent to be legally bound by the act
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1023.
168. Id.
169. See supra notes 126–129 and accompanying text (discussing Muniauction).
170. See supra notes 130–133 and accompanying text (noting that the Patent Act incorpo-
rated the common law doctrine of vicarious liability into Section 271(a)).
171. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text (describing the relationship between
the tort doctrine of vicarious liability and agency law).
172. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (“Agency is the fiduciary relation-
ship that arises when one person (a “principal”) manifests assent to another person (an
“agent”) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s con-
trol, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”).
173. See id. at § 3.01, cmt. b (“A principal’s unexpressed willingness that another act as
agent does not create actual authority.”).
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of the agent.174 Thus, the mere fact that one party has in some way
“condition[ed] participation in an activity or [the] receipt of a ben-
efit” on another party’s completion of a particular task does not, in
and of itself, give rise to an agency relationship, and thus would not
trigger vicarious liability at common law. Instead, agency relation-
ships require a more express agreement between the parties that
“the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the
principal’s control.”175
Despite this inconsistency with the common law doctrine, the
Akamai II en banc court believed that its new divided infringement
standard was supported by a principle endorsed by the U.S. Su-
preme Court in the 2005 copyright case of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.176 Specifically, the Court in Grokster had
determined that a defendant could be held vicariously liable for
another’s direct infringement of a copyrighted work so long as the
defendant both profited from the infringement and declined to ex-
ercise a right to stop or limit it.177
The Akamai II court offered no explanation or justification for
why it believed it was appropriate to incorporate the copyright stan-
dard for vicarious liability into the Patent Act. Indeed, although it is
true that courts traditionally look to patent law for direction when
construing copyright law—due to the “historic kinship” between
the two bodies of law178—the copyright principle of vicarious liabil-
ity does not provide appropriate guidance in cases of divided patent
infringement insofar as Grokster’s discussion of vicarious liability oc-
curred in a very different context than that of divided
infringement.
Specifically, whereas divided patent infringement raises the ques-
tion of whether two or more parties should be held jointly liable for
the direct infringement of a patent, vicarious liability in the copy-
right context sets forth a basis for holding a party indirectly liable for
another’s direct infringement of a copyrighted work.179 In other
words, vicarious liability under copyright law does not apply in cases
174. See id. (“[A]n agent’s actual authority originates with expressive conduct by the prin-
cipal toward the agent by which the principal manifests assent to action by the agent with
legal consequences for the principal.”).
175. Id. at § 1.01.
176. 545 U.S. 913 (2005); see also Akamai Tech., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d
1020, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Grokster).
177. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 (noting that one “infringes vicariously by profiting from
direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it”).
178. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984).
179. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 (observing that vicarious liability a “doctrine[ ] of secon-
dary liability [that] emerged from common law principles”).
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where two parties jointly violate a copyright only through their com-
bined actions, but instead addresses cases in which one party has
helped encourage or facilitate another’s complete infringement of
a copyrighted work. Thus, the form of vicarious liability considered
in Grokster is more akin to patent law’s doctrine of inducement, in
which a party is held liable for encouraging and supporting an-
other’s direct infringement of a patent.180
Moreover, the Akamai II en banc court failed to recognize the
different respective bases for direct and indirect liability in patent
and copyright law. Unlike in patent law, where both direct and indi-
rect liability are specifically governed by statute,181 indirect liability
has never been codified in the Copyright Act.182 As a result, courts
have been forced to fill in the gap by formulating their own com-
mon law rules for indirect copyright infringement. Consequently,
while the Grokster Court retained the authority to set forth a com-
mon law standard for vicarious copyright liability (one based on the
1963 case of Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. H.L. Green Co., Inc.183),
vicarious liability in the context of divided patent infringement
must instead be delineated as the law existed in 1952, when the
Patent Act codified the circumstances giving rise to the direct in-
fringement of a patent. Therefore, because the en banc Federal
Circuit’s expansion of vicarious liability in Akamai II was at odds
with the traditional common law doctrine,184 it does not provide a
permissible basis for extending direct infringement liability under
the Patent Act.
Thus, despite six different attempts in the last ten years, the Fed-
eral Circuit has been unable to devise a standard that both
equitably balances the competing policy concerns presented by di-
vided infringement and remains consistent with the Patent Act’s
codification of common law. As a result, divided infringement will
likely continue to vex courts for the foreseeable future unless and
until Congress amends the Patent Act.
180. See supra notes 59–64 and accompanying text (describing the law of inducement
under the Patent Act); see also 6 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 21:79 (2015) (noting that the Grokster
Court’s theory of vicarious liability is closely related to the patent law doctrine of
inducement).
181. See supra notes 59–71 and accompanying text (discussing the Patent Act’s creation of
specific statutory provisions governing inducement and contributory infringement).
182. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 434 (“The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone
liable for infringement committed by another.”).
183. 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963); see also Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 (citing Shapiro).
184. See supra notes 171–175 and accompanying text (comparing the Akamai II standard
to the common law principle of vicarious liability).
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IV. CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE PATENT ACT TO ADDRESS
DIVIDED PATENT INFRINGEMENT
As the foregoing analysis revealed, courts have struggled to equi-
tably resolve cases of divided patent infringement under the
existing statutory framework due to conflicting policy concerns, as
evidenced by the Federal Circuit’s series of ever-changing stan-
dards.185 Because this confusion primarily results from the narrow
and shortsighted manner in which Section 271(c) defines contribu-
tory infringement, Congress should take steps to reincorporate the
full breadth of the common law principle of contributory tort liabil-
ity back into the Patent Act.
A. The Current Statutory Framework Prevents Courts From Equitably
Resolving Divided Infringement Cases
The Federal Circuit’s failure to establish a consistent standard for
divided infringement is understandable given the constraints of the
existing statutory framework. Since the Patent Act prevents courts
from relying on the full breadth of the common law tort doctrine of
contributory liability, courts have instead been forced to either im-
permissibly expand the scope of liability authorized at common law,
or choose between two suboptimal alternatives.
On the one hand, although the BMC Resources standard restrict-
ing divided infringement liability to cases in which one party directs
and controls the activities of another is consistent with the common
law doctrine of vicarious liability codified in the Patent Act,186 it nev-
ertheless created a substantial loophole for would-be infringers to
exploit. By simply working together at arms-length to divide the
performance of the infringing steps among themselves—without
any one party directing and controlling the others’ activities—com-
panies could often utilize a patented method without fear of
185. See supra Part III.
186. See supra notes 131–132 and accompanying text (discussing the incorporation of
principles of vicarious liability in the Patent Act).
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incurring infringement liability.187 As a result, patent-holders fre-
quently found themselves left without recourse for infringement
under the BMC Resources standard.188
On the other hand, any attempts to expand the scope of divided
infringement liability to encompass infringing acts divided between
more loosely connected parties—such as the standard suggested by
the Federal Circuit in On Demand189—are also problematic. Not
only is such an approach at odds with the common law principles
codified in the Patent Act,190 but it also raises considerable notice
concerns. Indeed, such an approach threatens to hold countless in-
nocent actors strictly liable for infringement merely because they
happened to perform one step of a patented method without know-
ing that their activities were being combined with those of another
to infringe a patent.191 Regrettably, this is not merely a speculative
or hypothetical concern, as recent years have reportedly seen an
increase in the number of lawsuits seeking to hold customers liable
for unwittingly assisting a service provider with the infringement of
a patent.192 Consequently, any expansion of liability to encompass a
187. See Stacie L. Greskowiak, Note, Joint Infringement After BMC: The Demise of Process Pat-
ents, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 351, 399 (2010) (asserting that under the BMC Resources/
Muniauction standard, “a method patent [may] be . . . effortlessly circumvented” effectively
“rendering the patentee’s rights essentially meaningless”); W. Keith Robinson, A Case Study of
Federal Circuit Policy Making, 66 SMU L. REV. 579, 597 (2013) [hereinafter Robinson, Case
Study] (finding that “in-house counsel [can] structure contracts so that a ‘mastermind’ is not
identified”); Josh Rychlinski, Note, Interactive Methods and Collaborative Performance: A New Fu-
ture for Indirect Infringement, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 215, 228 (2013) (noting
“the ease with which method patents can be directly infringed without consequence under
the single entity rule”).
188. See W. Keith Robinson, Ramifications of Joint Infringement Theory on Emerging Technology
Patents, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 335, 338 (2010) (concluding that “[a]bsent significant
evidence of how an accused infringer controlled third parties, patent holders have found it
difficult to support claims of infringement under a joint infringement theory”).
189. See supra notes 114–118 and accompanying text (reviewing the On Demand
precedent).
190. See generally supra Part I (discussing the various theories of vicarious and contributory
liability utilized in infringement cases at common law); see also supra notes 160–162 and
170–175 and accompanying text (observing that the Akamai II panel’s reliance on joint enter-
prise theory, and the Akamai II en banc court’s expansion of the standard for vicarious
liability are at odds with the Patent Act and underlying common law doctrine, respectively).
191. See Akamai Tech., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1307 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (“Because direct infringement is a strict liability tort, it has been thought that ex-
tending liability [to multiple independent parties collectively performing the steps of the
method claim] would ensnare actors who did not themselves commit all the acts necessary to
constitute infringement and who had no way of knowing that others were acting in a way that
rendered their collective conduct infringing.”).
192. See Rychlinski, supra note 187, at 229–30 (reporting that “litigation targeting the
unsuspecting third party has been . . . brought even though the third party may not have
deep pockets”).
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broader set of divided infringement cases can unfairly result in par-
ties being forced to guess whether—and how—other independent
actors are performing the rest of a patented process.193
Unfortunately, the dilemma presented by these conflicting policy
concerns is unlikely to dissipate anytime soon, as the recent
proliferation of divided infringement lawsuits appears likely to con-
tinue into the foreseeable future. Indeed, the increasing frequency
of divided infringement cases can be attributed in no small part to
the recent rise in the number of business method patents issued by
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.194 Unlike more traditional
manufacturing processes, many modern business methods are di-
rected towards electronic forms of commerce that are particularly
susceptible to being performed by multiple parties working to-
gether via the Internet.195 Performance of these business methods is
less likely to be divided among parties connected through an
agency relationship, but instead will typically be executed through
the combined actions of two or more entities operating at arms-
length, thus not giving rise to infringement liability under tradi-
tional notions of vicarious liability.196
These trends will likely accelerate in the future. As an initial mat-
ter, an ever-increasing number of new technologies are becoming
interconnected, with everything from wristwatches to washing ma-
chines  being designed to connect to the Internet.197 As a result, the
frequency with which multiple parties—the device manufacturer
193. See Michael A. Carrier, Limelight v. Akamai: Limiting Induced Infringement, 2014 WIS.
L. REV. ONLINE 1, 7 (2014) (explaining that “an expansion of [direct infringement] liability
could decrease the certainty and notice confronting potential infringers”). Expanded liability
would also raise a host of difficult damages issues regarding the proper apportionment of
liability in divided infringement cases involving only some loose connection between the
parties (i.e., those in which no “mastermind” is controlling the entire infringement). See
Rychlinski, supra note 187, at 230 (wondering how “damages [should] be calculated for an
entity that only practices some but not all steps of a method claim”).
194. See James S. Sfekas, Controlling Business Method Patents: How the Japanese Standard for
Patenting Software Could Bring Reasonable Limitations to Business Method Patents in the United
States, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 197, 203 (2007) (noting an increase in business methods
patent applications from 2,821 in 1999, to 7,800 in 2000).
195. See Reza Dokhanchy, Cooperative Infringement: I Get By (Infringement Laws) With a Little
Help From My Friends, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 135, 168 (2011) (noting that “business method
and software claims are prime targets for” divided infringement “because their elements are
easily separable”).
196. See Sean Africk, Note, Induced to Infringe: Divided Patent Infringement in Light of the
Akamai Ruling, 14 NEV. L.J. 620, 626 (2014) (observing that “[u]nlike with the manufacture
of tangible items, where the various parties are likely to have contractual or agency relation-
ships with one another, it is not uncommon that the parties performing a business-method
patent have little or no formal relationship”).
197. See Calo, supra note 7, at 1005 (recognizing the trend that “thermometers, appli-
ances, glasses, watches, and other artifacts” will increasingly “become networked into an
‘Internet of Things’ ”).
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and user, for example—interact is increasing, thereby giving rise to
potential divided infringement litigation. At the same time, the
growing specialization of the economy as a whole will also likely
continue to trigger new divided infringement lawsuits, as firms out-
source various business functions—many of which may constitute
part of a patented method.198
In most instances, both of these forms of interactions—i.e., (i)
between Internet-connected devices and (ii) between firms and
their outside vendors—will occur via arms-length coordination,
rather than via a formal agency relationship, they typically will not
satisfy the common law standard for vicarious liability. Therefore,
courts are likely to continue to be forced to choose between various
unsatisfying options when resolving divided infringement cases
under the existing version of the Patent Act.199
The resulting inability to reliably protect these inventive
processes under U.S. patent law threatens to disincentivize firms
from engaging in otherwise socially beneficial research and devel-
opment activities. Not only do inventions in the e-commerce,
wireless technology, and financial services industries often involve
the interaction of multiple participants,200 but increasingly so do
those in the emerging fields of biotechnology and personalized
medicine. For instance, because patented methods in the personal-
ized medicine sector may include both diagnostic testing and
genetic analysis steps, these patents are particularly susceptible to
198. See Robinson, Economic Theory, supra note 6, at 1978–79 (noting that “[p]artnering is
more efficient for [many] companies and allows them to specialize, which can result in
higher quality service”). A single credit card transaction, for instance, may now involve the
interaction of six or more participants. See id. (reporting the same).
199. Admittedly, recent changes in the law may reduce the frequency with which valid
patents are jointly infringed in the future. In particular, the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014), held that software
patents that simply disclose a method of performing otherwise unpatentable, abstract ideas
are invalid under Section 101 of the Patent Act. See id. at 2358 (concluding that “the mere
recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a
patent-eligible invention”). As a result, Alice potentially implicates a number of business
method and software patents. Indeed, some believe that Alice has already contributed to the
nearly forty percent reduction in the number of patent cases filed in the fall of 2014. Richard
Lloyd, Alice decision a big reason for sharp fall in US patent litigation, says Mark Lemley, IAM (Oct.
9, 2014), http://www.iam-media.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=dadf4dce-0f75-45dc-9339-
dacb0f7bb465 (explaining that Stanford Professor Mark Lemley “thinks the recent U.S. Su-
preme Court decision in Alice v. CLS may be a large part of the reason why” the number of
new patent infringement lawsuits “filed in September [2014] was down forty percent year-on-
year”).
200. See Robinson, Economic Theory, supra note 6, at 1967 (declaring that “divided infringe-
ment issues can arise with any technology that facilitates interaction between multiple . . .
parties”).
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having their claims divided among multiple parties working to-
gether at arms-length.201 As a result, firms may become less eager to
invest in this particularly promising field of medicine due to fears
that they will not be able to fully recoup their expenses should their
patented processes prove to be too easily usurped.202
Some scholars attempt to minimize the impact of these potential
policy concerns by suggesting that any limitations under current
law can be addressed through better claim drafting, with patentees
focusing their patent claims only on the activities of a single party
acting alone.203 While this strategy may help protect some paten-
tees, it is not a universal solution, as some patentable inventions
may inherently need to encompass functions performed by differ-
ent parties.204 Moreover, even those inventions that could in theory
be described with reference only to steps normally carried out by a
single actor may still be susceptible to circumvention by multiple
parties who discover that they can intentionally, but unnecessarily,
divide the performance of the infringing activities amongst them-
selves to avoid infringement liability.205
As a result, the existing statutory framework prevents courts from
establishing a standard that can consistently and equitably resolve
divided patent infringement lawsuits. Given the policy ramifications
of this state of affairs, legislative action is warranted.
201. See id. at 21 (discussing how “it may be more efficient for one entity [in the personal-
ized medicine industry] to perform the diagnostic testing and another entity to correlate a
detected marker with a disease or drug treatment”).
202. See Brian Ferguson, Seagate Equals Sea Change: The Federal Circuit Establishes a New Test
for Proving Willful Infringement and Preserves the Sanctity of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 24 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 167, 169 (2007) (recognizing that “[t]he judicial sys-
tem’s inability or refusal to enforce patent rights” may serve “as a disincentive to scientists to
continue to innovate” by allowing “unscrupulous infringers . . . to take advantage of the fruits
of the inventors’ labor without any adverse consequences.”); see also Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa
Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 311 (2013) (observ-
ing that the government awards patents to incentivize innovation); Gregory N. Mandel,
Leveraging the International Economy of Intellectual Property, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 744 (2014) (“It
is generally accepted that the primary objective of patent law is to incentivize innovation.”).
203. See Lemley et al., supra note 3, at 272 (“Most inventions that involve cooperation of
multiple entities can be covered using claims drafted in unitary form simply by focusing on
one entity and whether it supplies or receives any given element.”).
204. See Greskowiak, supra note 187, at 404 (declaring that “[u]nitary claim drafting is
impossible in some instances”).
205. See Robinson, Case Study, supra note 187, at 597 (noting an example in which “claims
directed to a single entity . . . still gave rise to joint infringement concerns” when “the defend-
ants still managed to divide the steps among them”).
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B. Congress Should Reincorporate the Full Breadth of the Common Law
Doctrine of Contributory Tort Liability Into the Patent Act
Congress should take steps to amend the statute because the dif-
ficulties presented by divided patent infringement have largely
resulted from the Patent Act’s shortsighted codification of the law
of contributory infringement. In particular, Congress should create
a new provision within Section 271 to address cases of divided in-
fringement, one that would fully reincorporate the traditional
common law principles of contributory tort liability into the Patent
Act. A new subsection (j), for instance, could provide that:
Whoever knowingly and collectively performs a patented process with
another shall be liable as an infringer.
Such a provision would prevent parties from intentionally circum-
venting the imposition of patent infringement liability by purposely
dividing the performance of a patented method between two or
more actors.
Importantly, however, by including a “knowingly” element in the
proposed statutory language, Congress would avoid the innocent
infringer issues that would be raised under the existing Patent Act
by expanding the scope of liability to reach acts of divided infringe-
ment performed by loosely connected parties.206 Indeed, such a
requirement would ensure that a party who simply performs one
step of a patented method would not face infringement liability if it
were unaware that its actions were being combined with those of
another party to violate a patent. So, for instance, in the case of the
hypothetical Internet user discussed above,207 merely submitting
some data to a website would not result in the user being held
jointly liable for infringing a patent, unless the user was specifically
aware that the website was collecting this information in order to
infringe a patented method.
Notably, then, the proposed provision would require knowledge
of both the patent-in-suit and the fact that one or more other par-
ties is performing the remaining infringing acts. This is consistent
with the Patent Act’s existing indirect infringement provisions, both
of which have been interpreted to require knowledge of the patent-
206. See supra notes 191–193 and accompanying text (discussing the notice concerns that
would be triggered by imposing divided infringement liability anytime two or more parties’
combined actions infringed a patent, regardless of how loosely connected the parties were).
207. See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text (raising the possibility that Internet
users could be held jointly liable for infringement in cases where they unwittingly performed
one step of a patented process, with the website performing the rest of the infringing steps).
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in-suit.208 With regards to Section 271(c), for instance, Justice Black
explained in Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro II)
that requiring knowledge of both the patent and infringing acts was
justified in cases of contributory infringement in order to protect
innocent parties who may be unaware that their activities contrib-
uted to the infringement of a patent.209 Such an approach is also
consistent with the underlying common law doctrine, which re-
quired that the offending parties be reasonably aware that their
actions would inflict an injury upon the plaintiff. 210
However, because the proposed statutory text refers to “know-
ingly and collectively perform[ing] a patented process with another,”
such a provision would apply anytime a party intentionally solicits
or instructs another party to perform part of a patented process, so
long as the instructing party was aware of both the existence of the
patent and the completion of the remaining infringing activities. In
other words, the hypothetical Section 271(j) would not require that
all parties involved in the divided infringement be aware that they
are contributing to the unauthorized performance of a patented
process; instead, merely one of the participants would need to know
that the parties’ collective actions constituted an infringement. So
while this provision would not result in a finding of liability for an
Internet user who unwittingly performs one step of a patented pro-
cess, a website could face liability if it knew that its actions,
combined with those of its users, violated a patent.
In short, the proposed statutory amendment would effectively re-
turn the law of contributory patent infringement back to its pre-
Patent Act roots. As discussed above,211 the common law tort doc-
trine of contributory liability would have allowed courts to impose
liability in divided infringement cases when one or more of the in-
fringers knew that their actions were being combined with those of
their collaborators to injure a patent-holder.212 Unfortunately, by
208. See supra notes 65 and 70–71 and accompanying text (discussing the knowledge re-
quirements read into inducement under Section 271(b) and contributory infringement
under Section 271(c)).
209. 377 U.S. 476, 525–28 (1964) (Black J., dissenting). In particular, Justice Black ar-
gued, “It is hard to believe that Congress intended to hold persons liable for acts which they
had no reason to suspect were unlawful, and as I have pointed out the legislative history
shows Congress did not.” Id. at 527.
210. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text (discussing the common law tort
doctrine).
211. See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of com-
mon law tort doctrine to cases of divided infringement).
212. See Oswald, supra note 1, at 18 (stating that contributory tort liability “is tempered by
a ‘culpability requirement’ that considers ‘whether a reasonable person, standing in the
shoes of the defendant, would have been aware of the misdeeds of another’”) (quoting Bar-
tholomew, supra note 95, at 465).
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shortsightedly drafting Section 271(c) to only capture the most
problematic form of contributory infringement arising at the time,
Congress foreclosed the possibility that future courts could rely on
this common law doctrine to resolve cases of divided infringe-
ment.213 The hypothetical Section 271(j) proposed above would
correct that mistake. In this respect, this solution is preferable to
alternative proposals in the academic literature that seek to address
divided infringement by either creating a new cause of action based
upon a previously unrecognized theory of patent liability,214 or ex-
panding the potential scope of liability under the existing statutory
framework.215
Some commentators will undoubtedly object to such a proposal
on the grounds that it would expand the scope of potential in-
fringement liability beyond that currently permitted by the Patent
Act. For those who believe that the patent system—and infringe-
ment litigation in particular—actually deter innovation,216 any
expansion of the sort proposed here may be viewed as undesirable.
However, even if one accepts the premise that the over-enforce-
ment of patents hinders technological innovation, the existing,
confused state of the law regarding divided infringement provides a
haphazard, suboptimal way to address the issue. Because divided
infringement cases arise in a variety of different industries217—some
of which may more legitimately require and deserve patent protec-
tion than others218—the impact of divided infringement is
distributed indiscriminately across fields. Indeed, even within a par-
ticular industry the effects of divided infringement may be spread
arbitrarily depending on the skill with which a particular patent’s
213. See, e.g., Truong, supra note 61, at 1922–25 (suggesting that courts should incorpo-
rate civil conspiracy law in cases of divided infringement).
214. See, e.g., Ahn, supra note 1, at 173–75 (advocating a broader standard for vicarious
liability under § 271(a)); Dokhanchy, supra note 195, at 162–63 (proposing a return to the
“some connection” standard for divided infringement endorsed by some district courts pre-
BMC Resources).
215. See, e.g., Ahn, supra note 1, at 173–75 (advocating a broader standard for vicarious
liability under § 271(a)); Dokhanchy, supra note 195, at 162–63 (proposing a return to the
“some connection” standard for divided infringement endorsed by some district courts pre-
BMC Resources).
216. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAU-
CRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008) (concluding that the patent system
actually disincentivizes innovation on the whole).
217. See supra notes 200–202 and accompanying text (identifying industries particularly
susceptible to divided infringement concerns).
218. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1581 (2003) (observing that “the cost of R&D varies widely from industry to industry
and from innovation to innovation”); Benjamin N. Roin, The Case For Tailoring Patent Awards
Based on Time-to-Market, 61 UCLA L. REV. 672, 676 (2014) (“There is overwhelming evidence
that the [patent] system’s costs and benefits vary greatly across industries.”).
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claims are drafted,219 and the extent to which would-be infringers
are motivated to exploit a particular patent by dividing its perform-
ance among multiple actors.220 All in all, then, the existing statutory
framework’s artificial limitation of the scope of divided infringe-
ment liability is a poor means by which to address more systemic
problems within the U.S. patent system.
It is also worth noting that the new statutory provision proposed
here could itself give rise to a loophole that allows parties to cir-
cumvent infringement liability in some cases. Specifically, if a party
intentionally remained unaware of how its partners completed their
portion(s) of a patented process, then it would lack the requisite
knowledge that it was “collectively perform[ing] a patented process
with another” as required under the proposed Section 271(j). And
if each of the parties involved in such a divided infringement inten-
tionally avoided knowledge of the particular nature of one
another’s acts, then no party would be liable for divided infringe-
ment under the proposed statute, even though their collective
actions infringed a patented process.
Therefore, the new proposed subsection could incentivize some
companies to learn as little as possible about the exact nature of
their partners’ operations.221 That being said, exploiting this loop-
hole would typically only be feasible in cases where the precise
means by which a process is performed is largely immaterial, and
the parties are instead merely contracting for the input or output
they will provide to one another. For example, imagine a patent
claiming a method for limiting the number of times a computer
user can view a digital video file over the Internet.222 If a company
providing access to a library of digitally stored movies wishes to limit
how often its users can view a particular file on its website, but does
not care how that restriction is implemented, then the company
could hire a vendor to provide this functionality without regard to
the specific manner in which it is performed. And if it turns out
219. See Lemley et al., supra note 3, at 272 (observing that in some cases, divided infringe-
ment concerns can be avoided by drafting claims that simply focus on the activities of one
entity).
220. See Robinson, Case Study, supra note 187, at 597 (noting an example in which “claims
directed to a single entity . . . still gave rise to joint infringement concerns” when “the defend-
ants still managed to divide the steps among them”).
221. Cf. id. at 604 (noting the possibility that “a vendor [may wish] to keep [its] methods
a secret”).
222. See Am. Patent Dev. Corp., LLC v. Movielink, LLC, 637 F. Supp. 2d 224, 226 (D. Del.
2009) (considering the “alleg[ed] infringement of United States Patent No. 5,400,402 . . .
which pertains to systems for controlling the use of video-on-demand programming”); see also
Keith Jaasma, Finding the Patent Infringement “Mastermind”: The “Control or Direction” Standard for
Joint Infringement, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 411, 434–36 (2010) (discuss-
ing Movielink).
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that the combined actions of the host site and vendor collectively
infringe the patent, then neither would be liable under the pro-
posed Section 271(j) because neither party would be knowingly
infringing an entire claim from the patent-in-suit.
While this potential loophole may appear unjust to some, it can
be justified as a matter of policy. Indeed, the fact that parties would
be willing to contract for some functionality without regard to the
specific manner in which it is performed suggests that the exact
process being used is largely insignificant, and that the use of a par-
ticular patented method is not important to the parties. As a result,
while not ideal from a patentee’s perspective, the failure to impose
liability in these cases is justifiable because the parties are not inten-
tionally attempting to circumvent a patent, but are instead merely
contracting with one another to perform some functionality in a
generalized manner. Even then, a patentee could potentially at-
tempt to trigger liability under the hypothetical Section 271(j) by
sending the parties a notice letter accusing them of infringement,
the receipt of which would force the parties to investigate how their
vendors are performing the allegedly infringing functionality.223
Alternatively, in cases where a party insists that the functionality
be performed in a specific way—in order to ensure that the result-
ing output is compatible with the rest of the coding for its website,
for instance—then the mastermind party would be liable for di-
vided infringement under the proposed statutory provision so long
as it was also aware of the patent-in-suit. In these cases, because the
party mandates that its vendor perform its share of the infringing
process in a particular manner, this would suggest that the specific
steps disclosed in the patent do have some value or importance. As
a result, the website would be knowingly and collectively infringing
the patent in violation of the hypothetical Section 271(j).
Finally, the proposed statutory provision may, in some cases, be
vulnerable to potential circumvention in another manner: through
the performance of one or more of the infringing steps abroad.
Due to the territorial limitations of the Patent Act, the Federal Cir-
cuit has held that in order to infringe a patented method, each and
223. See, e.g. nCube Corp. v. Seachange Int’l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(“Actual notice of another’s patent rights triggers an affirmative duty of due care to avoid
infringement.”); Rolls–Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1109 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (“It is by now well settled that where a potential infringer has actual notice of another’s
patent rights he has an affirmative duty of due care.”). Such a letter would also provide
notice of the patent-in-suit to the infringing parties, satisfying the knowledge requirement for
a finding of divided infringement under the proposed statutory provision.
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every step of the infringement must be completed within the
United States.224
Consequently, parties truly intent on circumventing patent pro-
tection following the enactment of the proposed Section 271(j)
could avoid infringement liability in some cases by simply perform-
ing one or more steps of the patented method abroad.225 This may
be feasible in cases involving computerized processes, for example,
where one or more of the steps of a method could easily be as-
signed to a server physically located in a foreign country. However,
it is important to note that this loophole already exists under cur-
rent law, and is not exclusive to divided infringement cases, nor is it
magnified by the proposed amendment to the Patent Act.226
Even if the proposed statutory amendment would not close every
potential loophole, it would bring much needed legislative clarity
and guidance to this area of the law. The dilemma presented by
divided patent infringement is largely of Congress’s own making,
Bearing in mind its resulting policy ramifications,227 the time has
come for Congress to take steps to correct this oversight.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the increasingly common phenome-
non of divided patent infringement. Although courts at common
law were well equipped to handle cases in which two or more par-
ties collectively infringed a patented process through the
imposition of contributory tort liability, Congress’s shortsighted
codification of the law of patent infringement in the Patent Act of
1952 prevents courts from relying on this doctrine in present-day
divided infringement lawsuits. As a result, subsequent courts have
struggled to equitably resolve these cases within the confines of the
Patent Act.
224. NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“We
therefore hold that a process cannot be used ‘within’ the United States as required by section
271(a) unless each of the steps is performed within this country.”).
225. See Lemley et al., supra note 3, at 271 (explaining that “as communications technolo-
gies support ever increasing bandwidth, virtually any innovation that employs computation or
decision-making is susceptible to placement of a particular component or step with an inde-
pendent vendor or outside the United States in a way that may avoid traditional infringement
remedies”).
226. See NTP, 418 F.3d at 1318.
227. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the ways in which the current statutory loophole may
disincentivize firms from undertaking socially beneficial research and development
activities).
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This Article proposes that Congress take steps to correct this mis-
take by enacting a new statutory provision governing cases of
divided patent infringement. By authorizing liability in lawsuits al-
leging that two or more parties have knowingly worked together to
infringe a patent, Congress can both ensure that would-be infring-
ers will be unable to intentionally circumvent patent protection,
and protect innocent actors who may unwittingly contribute to the
infringement of a patented process.
